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INTRODUCTION

with my pregnant wife
In early 2002, I climbed on a plane-along
a thirty-hour flight from Los Angeles
and two-year old daughter-for
in the south-central part of
to India. Our destination was Hyderabad,
two
living and working for the next
the country, where we would be
we got off, tired and anxious,
months. At the other end of the flight
world. Cows really did cross the
into a very different part of the
abandoned lots-sometimes right
streets. Shabby tent cities littered
loaded with husband, wife, and
in front of mansions. Motor scooters
and
three-wheeled taxis, pedestrians,
kids darted between bicycles,
dressed in bright reds, greens,
trucks. There were people everywhere,
shops
scurried among small roadside
pinks, and oranges, and they
eleven-and-a-half
all the time. It was
and cafes that seemed to be open
seemed
if anything, all of our senses
hours later back in L.A. but,
sharpened.
at a prominent new business
I had accepted a teaching position
it
several Western universities, and
school, started in conjunction with
India.
in
pulse of economic trends
was the perfect place to take the
were excited about technologyMost of the students and faculty
and the telecommunications
software development, networking,
had put Indian software programindustry in particular. Y2K fears
pressures in the wake of the dot-coin
mers to work, and IT budget
about
handful of students were talking
implosion kept them there. A
for
and software maintenance, but
outsourcing beyond call centers
like
things
to be elsewhere-on
the most part the focus seemed
all, technology.
above
and,
finance, consumer marketing
flight (actually a shorter
same
the
Nearly four years later, I took
and
a direct route into Hyderabad)
one this time since there was
to
at the business school. It is hard
returned for another teaching visit
was
I
while
that had occurred
describe the economic transformation
but now they corneverywhere,
still
away. The people and cows were
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peted with Hondas and Hyundais more than with bicycles. Gigantic
new shopping malls dominated the city center; several were multilevel stores specializing in just wedding apparel. Work crews demolished decrepit roadside shops to widen the streets, and many of the
shanty-towns were replaced with sparkling new office buildings.
Most strikingly, the signs of business outsourcing were everywhere. Loud explosions interrupted the late afternoon, as Microsoft
built a massive campus for thousands of workers. ' People argued over
the effects of English accent training on Indian culture-the buzz of
conversation was now peppered with a Manhattan staccato or southern drawl from some call-center workers. I asked my class of a hundred students whether they had worked on an outsourcing
transaction, and nearly seventy percent raised their hand. Everyone
2
was looking for the next wave-was it legal services outsourcing,
pharmaceutical R&D outsourcing, animation, or something else? You
could almost feel the exuberance in the air. And it wasn't just Hyderabad; even the Communist governments in West Bengal and Kerala
were aggressively courting foreign investment.- Business outsourcing
had saturated the Indian economy.
And India is certainly not the only country-although perhaps it
is the most prominent one-affected by business outsourcing. By
2008, an estimated 4.1 million jobs in the service sector will have
moved from developed economies to places like China, India, Russia,
Brazil, and the Philippines. 4 According to the McKinsey Global InstiI In fact, the Hyderabad facility will apparently become Microsoft's second-largest campus after its Redmond, Washington headquarters. See Saritha Rai, Microsoft

Expands Operations in India, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at Wi.
2 For a discussion of the possibilities here, see Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing
and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming May 2007).
3 For example, on a recent trip to Kolkata I was invited to meet with the Minister
for Information Technology for the State of West Bengal-an area reputed to have

taken a slow approach to outsourcing. I expected to discuss some basic questions
related to attracting foreign business, but was treated, instead, to a very sophisticated
PowerPoint presentation on why the Communist-led state was the ideal place to establish an offshore project. And, indeed, Kolkata has built some of the best roads in
India, cleared massive areas of land, amended labor laws, and sponsored elaborate

conferences

to court foreign investment.

Interview with Shri Manabendra

Mukherjee, Minister for Info. Tech. & Env't, Gov't of W. Bengal, India, in Kolkaa,
India (Dec. 8, 2005).
4 DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE EMERGING GLOBAL LABOR
MARKET: PART It-THE DEMAND FOR OFFSHORE TALENT IN SERVICES 23-25 (2005),
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/emerginggloballabornarket/partl/MGI-demand-fullreport.pdf. As of 2003, India controlled about a third of
the offshore services market; Ireland, Canada, the Phillipines, Israel, and other parts
of Asia were other large offshore service suppliers. Id. at 13 exhibit 1.
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could theoretically
tute, this is just a tiny proportion of the jobs that
160 million jobs in the service
be outsourced-it estimates that nearly
total employment, could be pereconomy, about eleven percent5 of
one expects this many positions
formed anywhere in the world. No
do project the size of the total offshorto move overseas, but analysts
6
rapidly.
ing market to grow
activity under their own conFirms keep some of this relocated
facilities that become, in essence,
trol by building "captive" offshore
7
firm.
foreign subsidiaries of the parent

But many of these projects

a firm's borders-as compaare moving economic production beyond
to do something that they have
nies contract with third party vendors
we are witnessing a significant
historically done themselves. In short,
realignment in the scope of the firm.
set of questions: Why has busiThis Article addresses an obvious
What is causing so many firms to
ness outsourcing grown so far so fast?
corporate and country borders?
move economic activity beyond their
law scholars because it
The question is important for corporate
the theory of the firm. Indeed,
raises foundational issues underlying
centralized control presents the
the decision to pool resources under
8
law literature. The issues date
fundamental tension in corporate
activities in
this figure by examining business
5 Id. at 22. McKinsey estimated
economy.
service
entire
the
these results to
eight industry sectors and extrapolating
of jobs
number
actual
the
that
suggest, however,
Id. at 22-23. The report does not
organizaciting a wide variety of industrial,
outsourced will come close to 160 million,
out
limit the number of jobs transferred
will
that
tional, regulatory, and social factors
25-28.
at
Id.
figure.
2.5% of this 160 million
of developed economies to roughly
REPORT 2005:
note 4, at 29; NASSCOM-McKINSE
supra
6 See, e.g., FARRELL ET AL.,
13 (2005),
INDUSTRIES
BPO
IN THE GLOBAL IT AND
EXTENDING INDIA'S LEADERSHIP
summary.pdf [herehttp://www.mckinsey.com/ideas/articles/Nasscom_3_Executive
services will
2005] (estimating that offshore
inafter NASSCOM-MCKINSEY REPORT
to the
related
statistics
collection of reports and
grow to $60 billion by 2010). A large
StatisSolutions,
Tech.
Time
also be found at Real
growth of offshore outsourcing can
http://www.rttsweb.com/outsourcing/statistics
tics Related to Offshore Outsourcing,
A CHANGE IN THE
DELOITrE CONSULTING, CALLING
see
But
2007).
16,
Jan.
(last visited
(2005), availableat http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/
OUTSOURCING MARKET 25
work(warning that outsourcing is not
content/us.outsourcing-callingachange'pdf
is likely to wane).
ing for many firms and that growth
of business outsourcing, and the important
categorization
precise
7 For a more
offshoring, see infra note 42.
distinction between outsourcing and
FOR LAWYERS 227
ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS
8 See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON
(to prodiscretion
value of retaining managerial
(2003) ("[T] he tension between the
Firm)
the
of
Nature
the
form, as outlined in Coase's
mote efficiencies in the corporate
corpoin
issue
central
the
.is
.
.
discretion
and the dangers of unchecked managerial
in CorporateLaw 9-10 (Yale Law Sch.,
Revolution
the
After
Romano,
Roberta
rate law.");
at http://
Research Paper No. 323, 2005), available
Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy,
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back at least seventy years-to the celebrated work of Ronald Coase9
and of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.10 On the one hand, it's nice
to be big. Assembling property under the discretionary control of a
small management team can certainly create economies of scale, save
transaction costs, and lead to other benefits.I But on the other hand,
it is now well established that the separation of ownership and control
can unleash a wide variety of bad manager behavior, such as shirking,
lavish compensation, entrenchment, and excessive risk-taking-collec12
tively referred to as agency costs.

This friction between size and sloth permeates the study of corporate law, especially in discussions of executive compensation and corporate capital structure.15 The extensive literature in these fields
debates the magnitude of agency costs and wrestles with ideas for miti14
gating these problems-using things like executive stock options,
management performance targets, 1 5 leveraged buyouts, 1 6 debt covessrn.com/abstract=-824050 (sketching the historical tension between transaction cost
and agency cost theories of the firm).

9
10

R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMIcA 386 (1937).
A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS,THE MODERN COmORAT1ON AND PR!VATE PROPERTY (1932).
11 Specific benefits of the corporate form and centralized managerial discretion
are discussed infra Part I.B.
12 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 112-16; Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-13 (1976). The agency cost problem is discussed infra Part
II.A.
13 For recent synthesis of work in these areas, see LuctAN BEBCHtJK & JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004) (exploring the tension in executive compensation); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CoRPoRATE FINANCE 68-73, 154-56 (2006) (collecting work on transactional economics and agency theory related to corporate
capital structure decisions).
14 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308-13, 323-25 (discussing the
use of options and equity compensation as a tool to reduce agency costs); Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 225, 261-62 (1990) (arguing that executive salary is not linked to performance); David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The FragileLegal Foundationof Incentive
Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 440, 452-59 (2000) (analyzing hedging transactions
used by managers to undermine the effectiveness of options as a technique for combating agency costs).
15 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 801 (2002) (discussing how
linking compensation grants to performance targets can avoid "windfall" compensation and better align manager incentives); Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of
Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. Ryv. 1869, 1879 (2001) (same).
16 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance,and
Takeovers, 16 Am.ECON. REv. 323, 323-25 (1986) ("[L]everaged buyout (LBO) transactions... are creating a new organizational form that competes successfully with the
ADOLF
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8 But the tension has
initiatives.'
nants,1 7 and shareholder access
9- which is surprising
outsourcing'
hardly been explored in business
such widespread public attention in
because outsourcing has received
20 This Article suggests that the business outsourcing
recent years.
for
but previously neglected, context
phenomenon offers a valuable,
is
ownership
that occur when
analyzing the fundamental tradeoffs
from
firm
it considers theories of the
parted from control. Essentially,
activity move outside the firm,
an opposite perspective: why does
inside it.
rather than why activity is placed
question: why have we seen
So let me come back to my earlier
balance between intrafirm activity
such a notable shift in the optimal
past decade? The conventional explaand interfirm contracts over the
runs something like this. Relanation for the outsourcing explosion

costs of free
advantages of controlling the agency
open corporate form because of
cash flow.").
Bonds, 51
A New Governance Structurefor Corporate
17 See, e.g., Yakov Amihud et al.,
the use
with
arise
that
(1999) (discussing the agency costs
LiabilSTAN. L. REv. 447, 453-56
Lender
of
Economics
The
Daniel R. Fischel,
relaof debt and various bond covenants);
lending
the
in
distortions
(discussing agency
of
ity, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 133-40 (1989)
Design
the
and
Yermack, Investment Opportunities
of
use
tionship); Marcel Kahan & David
the
with
136, 138 (1998) (raising problems
Debt Securities, 14J.L. ECON. & ORG.
mitigating creditor agency risk).
for
bond covenants as a mechanism
Power, 118
The Case for Increasing Shareholder
18 Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
possible would

("[M]aking shareholder intervention
HARV. L. REV. 835, 908 (2005)
shareholders and to
between management and its
operate to reduce agency costs
for Limiting ShareCase
The
with Stephen M. Bainbridge,
enhance shareholder value."),
that increasing
(arguing
(2006)
L. REV. 601, 603-12
holder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA
decisionmaking
centralized
of
value
the
undermine
shareholder intervention would
in large corporations).
agency costs of
scholarship has recognized the
19 Previous legal and economic
models of optimal conarticles deal with theoretical
business outsourcing, but most
See infranotes 126-27 and
practitioner-oriented advice.
tract design or with technical,
analysis of the
of previous work offering a detailed
accompanying text. I am unaware
agency risk.
mitigate
to
a typical outsourcing transaction
contractual methods used in
a bestsel(offering
(2005)
FLAT
Is
THE WORLD
20 See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN,
magazines
and
phenomenon). Business newspapers
ling account of the outsourcing
For a few typical
stories on the growth of outsourcing.
publish a constant stream of
3, 2003, at 50
Feb.
Wic,
Bus.
et al., Is Your Job Next?,
examples, see Pete Engardio
The really big
big job migration has just begun....
("Outsourcing experts say the
sourcing prac2010 or so • . . when global white-collar
offshore push won't be until
Nov. 24, 2003,
Fox, Where Your Job is Going, FORTUNE,
tices are standardized."); Justin
tech is hot,
where
city
a
a visit to Bangalore, India,
at 84 ("Where Your Job is Going:
lot lower than
whole
a
are
salaries
the
plentiful, and
the drinks are cold, work is
Just Keep on Growing,
IT and Remote-Service Industries
India's
Wave:
Next
The
yours.");
("So strong are the
57 [hereinafter The Next Wave]
EcONOMisT, Dec. 17, 2005, at
. . . back in
projections
rosy
what seemed improbably
forces driving this shift that
1999, are coming true.").
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prevented firms from
tively high transaction costs have historically
As these costs drop, howtapping into the global supply of labor.
digitization, standever-through improvements in communication, firms to embrace
for
ardization, and the like-it becomes economical
21 In essence, falling interaction costs have
overseas production.
driving down the price of ecounlocked a massive supply of labor,
forcprocesses, and tempting (or
23 This
nomic inputs, realigning business
ing22 ) managers

to move

production outside

the

firm.

and empirical observation, and
explanation comports with intuition
to the story.
certainly there must be some truth
is a second important catThis Article argues, however, that there
rooted in the agency
alyst for the rise of business outsourcing-one can bring interesting
outsourcing
cost problem. For while business
familiar anxieties. Just as a
some
opportunities, it also introduces
marketing literain the business management and
21 Much of this analysis occurs
to Smaller Firms?,
Lead
Technology
et al., Does Information
ture. See, e.g., Erik Brynjolfsson
of Information
Impact
The
al.,
et
Clemons
K.
Eric
40 MGMT. SCI. 1628, 1630-33 (1994);
Hypothesis,J.
Middle"
Economic Activity: "The Move to the
Technology on the Organizationof
The
Whang,
Seungjin
&
9, 11-14; Vijay Gurbaxani
MGMT. INFO. Sys., Fall 1993, at
Jan.
ACM,
oF
CoMms.
34
Markets,
Organizations and
Impact of Information Systems on
Mar& Arun Sundararajan, Electronic
Sankaranarayanan
Ramesh
63-66;
1991, at 59,
Paper
Working
3 (Ctr. for Digital Econ. Research, 4
kets, Search Costs and Firm Boundaries
. The popular
22
http://ssrn.com/abstract=78591
at
available
No. CeDER-05- , 2005),
See,
outsourcing.
business
and
in globalization
press gives similar accounts of the rise
FRIEDMAN, supra note
(1999);
14-29
WORLD
THE
e.g., LOWELL BRYAN ET AL., RACE FOR
20, at 126-36.
culand outsourcing involves macroeconomic
22 A central debate over offshoring
Jobs, Part
High-Skilled
of
Offshoring
The
effects. See, e.g.,
tural, distributional, and social
1 (2003) (opening
on Small Business, 108th Cong.
Comm.
House
the
Before
II: Hearing
[hereinafBusiness)
House Comm. on Small
of
statement of Don Manzullo, Chairman,
offshoring
"the
whether
Hearing] (questioning
ter House Comm. on Small Business
ecoterm
for the long
. . has serious consequences
high-paying, high-skilled jobs.
IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION
BHAGwATi,
nomic viability of this country"); JAGOISH
ITS DisE. STICLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND
JOSEPH
(2004) (advocating open markets);
related to globalization); Doug-

concerns
214-52 (2002) (presenting policy
(arguing
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2004, at Al6
America,
Goodfor
'Outsourcing'Is
las A. Irwin,
RobCraig
Paul
&
flexibility); Charles Schumer
the benefits of free trade and labor
(arguing
A23
at
2004,
6,
Jan.
Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES,
erts, Op-Ed., Second Thoughts on
fact that large
are required to deal with the
policies
trade
that more restrictive
issues, while
anywhere in the world). These
workforces can now be easily located
on
concentrate
will
I
a focus of this Article, and
certainly important, are not
proof
location
and
related to the organization
microeconomic, firm-level decisions
and social impact of these decisions.
macroeconomic
collective
the
duction-not on
Q.-SPECAL EDITION:
et al., Offshoring and Beyond, McKINSEY

CONTENTS

23

See Vivek Agrawal
Commoditization of
2003, at 24; Thomas H. Davenport, The Comingthe use of process

GLOBAL DIRECTIONs,

2005, at 100, 107-08 (discussing
Processes, HARv. Bus. REv., June
supra note 21.
standards to facilitate efficient outsourcing);

.....
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or make risky bets with shareCEO may slack off, build a fancy office,
may abuse its power to conduct
holder dollars, an outsourcing vendor
firm.2 4 Essentially, a company
economic activity that impacts another
is
the same dilemma where control
outsourcing an activity faces
25 The outsourcing vendor controls the
divorced from ownership.
"owns" the result. These agency
activity, while the outsourcing firm
to business outsourcing and are a
costs raise a significant impediment
economic activity within their
major reason why firms elect to keep
borders.

26

outsourcing has thrived
The thesis of this Article is that business
globalization has unlocked inexpenin recent years not only because
because it is becoming easier for
sive production markets, but also
agency costs of outsourcing. Over
firms to monitor and prevent the
a variety of intriguing tactics
the past decade, firms have undertaken
the business outsourcing context.
for mitigating agency problems in
of outsourcing contracts, I will
Drawing upon a detailed analysis
agency costs-including the use
explore several strategies to minimize
redundant agents, incentive-comof staged contractual commitment,
techniques. To be27sure,
patible compensation, exit rights, and other
or relational contract. But
the issues here can arise in any long-term
offers a fresh perspective
the recent explosion in business outsourcing and contractual steps to
strategic
on the ways that private parties take
minimize agency risks.
to manage several outFor example, it is certainly more expensive
exact same activity. But these
sourcing vendors who perform the
relations are
supra note 12, at 310 ("Contractual
24 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling,
credicustomers,
suppliers,
employees but with
the essence of the firm, not only with
these
of
all
for
exists
monitoring
costs and
tors, etc. The problem of agency
contracts. . . ").
sensethe agency vocabulary in an economic
25 Throughout this Article I use
relationagency
an
of
is that legal creation
and not in a legal sense. The difference
and gives rise to an elevated collecprincipal
the
by
control
of
ship requires a showing
OF AGENCY § 1, §§ 376-98
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
tion of agent responsibilities. See
No. 2, 2001).
AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft
(1958); R.ESTATEMENT (TtuRw) OF
26 See infra Part II.B.
typically explores situations where parties
27 The relational contracting literature
law-to govern
private ordering-rather than the
rely on long term relationships or
of Relational
Principles
Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
business affairs. See, e.g., Charles J.
and
Contracts
Long-Term
Hviid,
(1981); Morten
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092-95
46-72
at
§ 4200,
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Relational Contracts, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
relational conthe
(reviewing
2000)
eds.,
Geest
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de
Contracts, 75
Long-Term
in
Conflict and Cooperation
tracting literature); Robert E. Scott,
will present
contracts
these
of
The lasting nature
CAL. L. REv. 2005, 2009-12 (1987).
wealth.
party's
other
the
affects
that
activity
agency risk if one party controls economic
12, at 308-13.
Jensen & Meckling, supra note
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risk through benchmarking or
increased costs might reduce agency
vendors is becoming a popular
other means-and the use of multiple
28 I argue that firms are increasingly willing to
outsourcing strategy.
reduced agency risk because it is
trade greater monitoring activity for
the same forces that are
becoming cheaper to do so. In essence,
making it more cost-effective to
opening overseas markets are also
by outsourcing partners. And I
detect and prevent misbehavior
agency costs of outsourcing is
believe that this ability to reduce the
movement of activity beyond
another important factor in the rapid
firm borders.
I explores the recent rise of
The Article proceeds as follows. Part
outsourcing to foundational acabusiness outsourcing and relates
firm. Part 1I briefly discusses the
demic literature on the theory of the
how it arises in the outsourcagency cost problem and demonstrates
and analyzes strategies that firms
ing context. Part III then presents
agency costs of outsourcingare using to detect and prevent these
and terms of a typical outsourcing
shedding new light on the structure
the more general proposition that
project. It continues by discussing
it easier, at least in some cases, to
falling interaction costs are making
that this is contributing
contain the agency risks of outsourcing-and
activity from firm to market. A
to increased relocation of economic
claims.
brief conclusion summarizes these
I.

THE RISE

OF BUSINESS OUTSOURCING

The Offshoring and OutsourcingExplosion
nothing new. As transportaRelocating economic production is
costs fall, companies have
tion, communication, and other interaction areas with cheaper, and
activity to
continually sought to move business
2 9 Historically, firms focused mostly on
less restrictive, labor markets.
expansion. Manufacturing activity,
domestic or nearby international
northeastern United States to
for example, slowly migrated from the
advantage of nonunionized labor
the South and Southwest to take
3 0 Similarly, Hollywood started filming and editing
and tax benefits.
studios in Los Angeles, as
movies in Canada, 1instead of at expensive
A.

early as the 1940s.3

28 See infra Part III.A.2.
4, at 12;
at 11-35; FARRELL ET AL., supra note
29 BRYAN ET AL., supra note 21,
2005, at
Extreme Competition, McKINSEY Q.,Jan.
William I. Huyett & S. Patrick Viguerie,
47, 49-52.
4, at 12.
30 FARRELL ET AL., supra note
North: The Impact of Costs and DemaracHollywood
Droesch,
31 See, e.g., Audrey
4 (May 20, 2002) (unpublished manuscript),
tion Rules on the Runaway Film Industry
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Lately, however, the relocation of economic activity has moved
much further afield. Millions of jobs are flowing to India, China, and
other low-cost producers. 32 The total size of the offshore services market3 3 -recently estimated at $12.2 billion for India, $8.6 billion for
Ireland, and over $3.4 billion for China 4 -is expected to jump to
$110 billion by 2010.35 And economic globalization has also taken a
new spot in our public consciousness. According to a recent report by
the McKinsey Global Institute, "Offshoring has rapidly become part of
the everyday social lexicon. Conflicting and sensational reports of
developed-world companies moving jobs to emerging markets... are
36
now a staple of the news media and political debate."
This transformation spans all sectors of the economy. Perhaps
the highest profile areas of change involve customer call centers,
information technology services, and back-office support. But the
business outsourcing phenomenon is not just about tedious papershuffling efforts or mindless computer programming slots. Overseas
7
analysts process sophisticated derivative contracts for Wall Street.f
Doctors interpret digital CAT scans and x-rays for Western hospitals.38
And molecular biology PhDs discover new drugs for pharmaceutical
firms.3 9 Information technology continues to play a major role in offavailable at http: //www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/honors%5Ftheses.bak/
Droesch.pdf; BPO Goes to Hollywood, KNOWLEDGE@WI-ARTON, Oct. 31, 2006, http://
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=41 10.
32 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
33 While a great deal of outsourcing has involved manufacturing activity, this Article focuses on the more recent phenomenon of services-based outsourcing.
34 FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 13 exhibit 1.
35 NASSCOM-McKINsE' REPORT 2005, supra note 6, at 14.
36 FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 11. The 2004 presidential campaign, in particular, positioned outsourcing as an important issue, with John Kerry berating "'Benedict Arnold' bosses" on the campaign trail. See, e.g., The Great Hollowing-Out Myth,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 2004, at 27. According to Kiran Karnik, president of the Indian
business lobby NASSCOM, the outsourcing outrage has faded greatly since thenalthough renewed political backlash remains a risk to outsourcing vendors. Interview
with Kiran Karnik, President, NASSCOM, in Kolkata, India (Dec. 9, 2005).
37 The Next Wave, supra note 20, at 57 ("J.P. Morgan Chase . .. is to double, to
about 9,000, its staff [in India]. One task for the new recruits is to settle complex
structured-finance and derivative deals, what one insider calls 'some of the most
sophisticated transactions in the world."').
38 Jay Solomon, Traveling Cure: India's New Coup in Outsourcing: Inpatient Care,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at Al.
39 Good Chemistry: Mere Copycats No Longer, Indian Firms are flaunting Their Research
Skills, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 2006, at 58 ("Many analysts . . . see a big opportunity for
India as a place for the outsourcing of drug discovery.").
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Of course, sending jobs abroad does not always work. Some firms
seem to regret their actions, explaining that they are being forced
against their desire-perhaps by Adam Smith's invisible hand-to
move work overseas. 4 4 Other companies report, after launching an
outsourcing project, that the result is abject failure. 45 One recent
study argued that "[i] n the near future, with structural risks that cannot be fully mitigated, . . . and a multitude of components to manage ....
outsourcing will likely lose luster for large organizations. ' 46

And even when an outsourcing project succeeds, the vendor may soon
47
request higher pay to keep workers from hopping jobs.
Nevertheless, despite this turmoil, business outsourcing continues to flourish, and most observers expect even greater growth. A
recent report estimates that offshore services will rise to $110 billion
by 2010.48 In India, outsourcing generates nearly five percent of the

country's GDP, and revenues are expected to increase at a compound
annual growth rate of thirty-seven percent through 2010. 4 9 Ninety-five
sourcing transactions approached $240 billion in 2001; captive offshoring volume was
roughly one-tenth as large, at $22 billion. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 15
exhibit 3. Domestic shared services are excluded from these estimates. Id.
44 For example, Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle Corporation, has publicly worried
that Silicon Valley will become another Detroit by 2008. House Comm. on Small Business Hearing, supranote 22, at 2. Andy Grove, former CEO and Chairman of Intel, has
expressed similar sentiments: "Given cost and productivity pressures [Intel] has no
choice but to continue sending work abroad ....

The US could lose the bulk of its

information technology jobs to overseas competitors in the next decade." Michael
Schroeder & Timothy Appel, Skilled Workers Mount Opposition to Free Trade, Swaying
Politicians,WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at Al.

45 Deloitte Consulting, for example, recently published a provocative report
claiming that "outsourcing is an extraordinarily complex process, and the anticipated
benefits often fail to materialize." DELOrrE CONSULTING, supra note 6, at 2. According to this study, the leading causes of failure include hidden costs, inferior quality, a
loss of flexibility, poor planning, and high vendor employee turnover. Id. at 5.
46 Id. at 3.
47 Some of the most popular outsourcing destinations report annual attrition
rates near fifty percent. See, e.g., Busy Signals: Too Many Chiefs, Not Enough Indians,
EcoNoMisT, Sept. 10, 2005, at 60; Growing Pains: At Both High and Low Ends of the
Industry, the Problems of Success, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 2003, at 51. The attrition is
largely driven by a rapid increase in wages; workers in the hottest parts of India and
Russia, for example, have seen their salaries grow fifty percent over the past few years.
See Diana Farrell, Smarter Offshoring, HARV. Bus. REV., June 2006, at 85, 86.
48 See NASSCOM-MCKINsEv REPORT 2005, supra note 6, at 14. Many other studies
estimate similarly high levels of growth. See sources cited supra note 6.
49 Virtual Champions, supra note 42, at 4; Now for the Hard Part:A Survey of Business
in India-If in Doubt, Farm It Out: But Outsourcing Firms Are Having Increasing Trouble
FindingSuitable Workers, ECONOMIST, June 3, 2006, at 6 [hereinafter If in Doubt, Farm it

Out].
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a series of detailed contracts on the open market for the inputs and
activities needed to create new goods-thus enabling a producer to
tap into the decentralized and disciplined price system of the market. 56 Essentially, an entrepreneur could simply stitch together a "virtual" business venture by grabbing inputs and services through
complete contracts covering every possible state of the world.
But we do not live in a world of perfect markets or costless contracting, and one of Coase's great insights was that performing some
activities within a firm might reduce the transaction costs of using
external market pricing mechanisms. 57 Production costs are likely to
be higher when business is conducted within the firm-because the
activity is walled off from the relentless pricing pressure that comes
with well-functioning markets. 53 Yet these greater production costs
might nevertheless be worth paying if a firm can save even more by
avoiding other costs related to arms-length transactions.
Coase was a little vague on the exact nature of these other costs, 5 9
however, and much of the literature since then discusses the transaction costs (broadly defined) of using a market and how these costs
might be avoided when an activity is conducted within a firm. Scholars have developed a range of cost possibilities, and I will trace just a
few ideas here. First, and perhaps most obviously, forming an agreement costs money. It can be expensive to negotiate and draft detailed
contracts-especially if parties need to include clauses that govern
arcane contingencies. 60 One potential benefit of centralized firm
56

Id.

57 Coase, supra note 9, at 390-91.
58 In other words, a firm that does everything itself will probably pay more for
most of its economic inputs-after all it is unlikely to be the lowest cost producer of
everything. Nevertheless, the firm may still choose to keep control of many activities

to guarantee a source of supply (thus protecting against a form of market failure) or
to cut the transaction costs (broadly defined) of securing the input. The retailer 7Eleven, for example, was famous for owning the cows used to make milk that it sold in
its stores. Mark Gotfredson et al., Strategic Sourcing: From Periphery to the Core, HARv.
Bus. REV., Feb. 2005, at 132,

135.

59 See Foss et al., supra note 54, § 5610, at 640 (describing Oliver Williamson's
claim that Coase's basic story long awaited "operationalization").
60 These costs arise, most obviously, from the time and effort required to work
through contractual details. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNOMICS 211-14 (4th ed. 2004); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Or LAW 299-301 (2004); Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 27, § 4000, at 1-2; Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 594-95
(2003). But the parties may face other expenses if bounded rationality at the time of
contracting prevents them from delineating how certain issues should be handled,
even though it would be in their joint interests to do so. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisen-
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control, then, is the reduction of price discovery, negotiation, and
contracting costs arising under market transactions. As the theory
goes, moving economic activity into a firm might reduce some transac61
tion costs by replacing them with ex post governance mechanisms.
Instead of bothering to write a detailed contract, a firm maintains
enough discretion over the activity to make the optimal decision
later-if and when a future uncertainty emerges. 6 2 Thus, depending
on the exact nature of the economic activity, and the likely complexity
of transaction costs, a firm will choose between markets and firm
63
"hierarchies" to secure the input.
Over time, more nuanced descriptions of contracting transaction
costs have emerged, providing additional rationales for the decision
to place economic activity within the firm. Oliver Williamson developed a theory involving relation-specific investments-or assets that
64
have high value to a specific user but lower value to everyone else.
berg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 214-16
(1995); Herbert A. Simon, A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship, 19
ECONOMETRICA 293, 294-95 (1951).

61 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 700-09 (1986).
62 Coase's early work on the subject similarly recognized that keeping control of
an activity might allow firms to capitalize on future uncertainty. See Coase, supra note
9, at 391-92.
63 See Foss et al., supra note 54, § 5610, at 635-42. This distinction between firms
and markets faces some criticism, however, because it fails to account for the fact that
workers within a firm can often exercise market power by exiting the organization.
See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization,62 Am. ECON. REv. 777, 782-83 (1972).
64 In a series of important articles, Williamson demonstrated how placing these
assets into a single firm could remove costs that might arise through opportunistic
behavior. More specifically, if the economic activity involving these assets is not
lumped into a firm, a contractual counterparty might seek to expropriate some of the
unique economic surplus from the relation-specific investment. See OLIvER E. WIL.
LIAMSON, MARYETS AND HIERARCHIES 82-105 (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of
Economic Organization, 4 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 65, 76-83 (1988); Oliver E. Williamson,

The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REv.
112, 115-17 (1971). More recent work has linked the rise of the corporate entity to
its ability to allow joint owners (shareholders) to "lock-in" or commit assets to a venture without facing a risk that their co-owners will behave opportunistically. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizersin
the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REv. 387, 423-41 (2003); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 259-65 (1999).
But see Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock In Lock-in?, 7-9, 17-19 (II. Law and Econ.
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. LE06-005, 2006), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=883648 (arguing that there are economic costs to lock-in and questioning this historical account for the rise of the corporation). Similar logic involving
relation-specific assets and investments has also been used to demonstrate the need
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Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, John Moore, and others developed a
"property rights theory of the firm," under which assets should be
owned by the entity making the most important, relation-specific
investment.65 More recently, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales
have extended this theory beyond physical assets by arguing that firms
can control access to all assets-including specialized human capital. 66 And certainly there are other possible ways to articulate the ben67
efits of using firm hierarchies over markets.
While these theories differ in their exact specification of the costs
or distortions that might arise with market transactions-and thus the
rationale for placing production within a firm-they all provide an
explanation for the rise of outsourcing in a dynamic world. Each theory implies that the optimal location of economic activity is the result
of a careful balance between production cost savings from using markets, and transaction cost savings (again, broadly defined) from using
firms. Thus, for instance, under a property fights theory of the firm,
production will continue to take place within a firm until the marginal
benefit from avoiding counterparty opportunism is outweighed by
higher production costs. In other words, we would expect a firm to
optimize the cost of producing each input against the transaction
costs of a market contract in order to decide exactly where to erect
the firm's borders.68 In a static world, this balance should hold, and
the division of activity between firm and market would be roughly
constant.
But because we live in a dynamic world, both production costs
and transaction costs for various activities can increase or decrease as
new technologies or suppliers come online. This suggests that the
borders of a firm will continue to change as the underlying tension
for contract law to provide a mechanism for parties to inexorably bind themselves
through promise-when they do choose to incur the transaction costs of a market
exchange. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 60, at 559-62.
65 As the theory runs, this allows the economic actor with the most to lose to
retain residual control-and thus guard against opportunism by the other partieswhen it is difficult or prohibitively expensive to write contracts that govern key contingencies. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 61, at 700-10; Oliver Hart, An Economist's
Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1771-74 (1989); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119,
1131-39 (1990).
66 See Raghuram G. Rajan& Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 387, 388 (1998).
67 For instance, firms may wish to produce critical inputs on their own to protect
against monopoly or oligopoly supply markets.
68 See Coase, supra note 9, at 395.
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between production costs and transaction costs oscillates. 69 And
indeed, we do observe a constant stream of corporate reorganization
through buyouts, mergers, spin-offs, and long term outsourcing
contracts.
Viewed in this light, incomplete contracting theories of the firm
provide a logical explanation for the growth of business outsourcing.
If barriers to securing economic inputs via remote markets drop rapidly-perhaps due to technological, regulatory, or other factorsthen we would expect the historical balance between firm and market
to change. Increased supply will boost the gains from procuring
inputs on the market, causing some firms to outsource activity beyond
the corporate borders. 70 And certainly there is plenty of evidence that
shifting activity to overseas markets can result in significantly cheaper
production costs.

71

The unlocking of remote production, and the corresponding rise
in economic globalization, has been linked to a variety of factors.
First, communication costs have plummeted in response to new technologies and a rapidly expanding infrastructure. 72 Other technological advances-including faster processing power, better compression
algorithms, and cheaper data storage-make it easier to digitize economic activity. 73 This digitization allows firms to carve off business
processes from the value chain and perform them anywhere in the
world. And finally, the very nature of these business processes may
also be changing as companies and industry consortiums push for
greater standardization.7 4 Common standards make it easier for firms
to choose the sequence of their business processes, measure how well
each activity is performed, and manage how these processes are con-

69 SeeJACKSON ET nA.., supra note 8, at 227.
70 The analysis is, admittedly, a little more tricky than this because a firm might
still enjoy some of these cost savings by setting up captive offshoring ventures where
they can keep control of the activity. See supra note 42. Thus the relevant question is
whether the transaction costs of using the market have fallen faster than the costs of
conducting captive offshoring. Recent growth in outsourcing deals suggest that this
might be true in some contexts. See, e.g., Sankaranarayanan & Sundararajan, supra

note 21, at 9-12 (modeling the effects of lower interaction costs on interfirm and
intrafirm activity). For a specific example where this appears to be the case, see infra
notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.

72

See, e.g.,

73
74

supra note 21, at 22-28;
20, at 59-76.

BRYAN FT AL.,

14; FRIEDMAN, supra note

BRYAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 23-24.
See Davenport, supra note 23, at 107.

FARRELL ET AL.,

supra note 4, at
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ducted over time. 75 In short, there are reasons to believe that it is
becoming easier to source production around the world.
There is also ample evidence that production costs are much
lower in developing economies. For example, a software programmer
earning sixty dollars per hour in the United States may earn just six
dollars in India. 76 Similarly, a data entry worker earning twenty dollars in the United States commands two dollars in India. 77 Raw wage
differences probably exaggerate the cost savings because offshoring
requires higher communications costs and greater management infrastructure. 78 But even taking these new costs into account, it has been
estimated that using emerging labor markets can cut some costs in
half.

79

And the economic benefits of offshoring go beyond labor arbitrage. Cheaper production gives firms new options for structuring the
flow of business activities. This may open opportunities to improve
efficiency by making different trade-offs between labor and capital
inputs. Changing the sequence of business processes, for example,
may increase overall labor costs but lower total costs through higher
capital productivity.8 0 Similarly, firms may also use outsourcing as a
way to increase revenues. For example, cheaper labor allows some
companies to pursue delinquent accounts receivable balances that
75 Id. For greater discussion of these benefits, see infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
76 See MCKINsEY GLOBAL INST., OFFSHORING 1 (2003), available at http://
www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/win-win-game.asp.
77 Id. These estimates may not reflect recent wage inflation. See Farrell, supra
note 47, at 92.
78 Id. at 2.
79 Id. Of course, the cost of production in each location must also be adjusted
for any difference in quality. Some firms refuse to move work overseas, claiming that
the lower quality of the work more than offsets any cost savings. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN,
supra note 20, at 36-38 (presenting examples where firms insist on using domestic
outsourcing). On the other hand, in certain contexts, the quality of offshored work
may be higher than that of developed economies. For example, the United States
Department of Defense (DOD) has created the Capability Maturity Model (CMM)
standard as a quality standard for information technology work. Firms who do not
conduct business with the DOD largely ignore the standard, but many IT firms in
India have seized upon CMM ratings as a way to demonstrate their quality-and have
successfully obtained level five awards (the highest level of certification). See Ravi
Aron, A View From the Developing World, KNOWLEI)GE@WHARTON, Mar. 25, 2004,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=862. Some regions have
recently developed reputations for very high quality work in certain industries-such
as China in wireless communications and Bangalore, India in software development.
80 See Agrawal et al., supra note 23, at 30-33.
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they have previously been forced to ignore.8 1 Finally, firms may be
able to develop new products for lower income countries or offer new
8 2
support services that were previously uneconomical.
According to the conventional story, then, a variety of forces have
shifted the tipping point between in-house activity and external market activity by opening remote sources of supply. These low cost markets unlock economic gains, most immediately through price
arbitrage, but also via new revenue opportunities or reengineered business processes. This story makes economic sense, it is the one given
by most firms when they announce an outsourcing decision, and I
certainly would not dispute that lower production costs are a major
factor underlying the rise of business outsourcing.
But if the economic benefits of offshore outsourcing are so great,
then why haven't we seen even more business activity move overseas?
A recent estimate suggests, after all, that fewer than three percent of
eligible jobs have been outsourced.8 3 One answer, as many executives
can tell you, 8 4 is that moving economic activity out of a firm often
creates some problems of its own. It becomes harder to ensure that
the work is being performed correctly, or that vendors are expending
adequate effort. Or vendors may be taking unknown risks as they conduct operations, risks that an outsourcing firm would never feel comfortable taking itself. More generally-and as the next Part will
discuss-business outsourcing projects give rise to an agency cost
problem.
II.

A BRIEF

REVIEW OF THE AGENCY COST PROBLEM

Many decades ago, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously
argued that economic centralization comes with a price.8 It is often
costly-and not fully possible-to prevent parties from taking selfinterested actions when they are empowered to make decisions that
affect other people's property. In other words, the very act of deputizing someone else to run your affairs raises incentives for suboptimal
behavior. This Part briefly summarizes these economic distortions,
collectively termed agency costs, and demonstrates how they can
occur in a business outsourcing transaction.
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 34.
Id. at 34-35.
See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 25-28; supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 310.
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Risk
Shirking, Gluttony, Entrenchment, and
whenever one party (the agent)
The agency cost problem arises
of
decisions that affect the wealth
has discretionary power to make
asymon
can really be blamed
another (the principal). 86 The trouble
for a principal to observe and
metrical information, If it cost nothing
link to ultimate economic outunderstand how an agent's actions
no reason to behave differently
comes, then the agent would have
8 7 But it is often difficult to know whether a poor
than the principal.
behavior or by external conditions.
outcome is caused by an agent's
cannot necessarily be inferred from
The world is complex, and results
to capitalize on this haziness by
inputs. Agents may therefore choose
themselves-at the expense of
using discretionary power to benefit
uninformed principals.
agency cost problem? There
What type of behavior underlies the
concern: (1) insufficient effort or
are at least four broad areas of
or self-dealing; (3) entrenchment;
shirking; (2) lavish compensation
8
8
and (4) poor risk management.
type of distortion is to consider
The easiest way to illustrate each
money. How might she personan agent hired to invest a billionaire's
expense? First, the agent might
ally benefit at the rich principal's
without conducting adequate
shirk by making investment decisions
may just throw a dart at a list of
due diligence. For example, she
research on the best place to
stocks instead of performing careful
8 9 Second, in the absence of legal protection, the
invest the money.
actions to boost her compensaagent may take a variety of self-dealing
that kick-back bribes or traveling
tion-things like investing in firms
90 Third, the agent might make bad
to exotic investor conferences.
A.

and ecobeen discussed extensively in the legal
86 The agency cost problem has
id. and
in
found
be
can
work
this
for much of
nomic literature. The foundation
of this
scope
A full bibliography is beyond the
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12.
Arrow,
J.
theory can be found in Kenneth
Article; additional background on agency
Richard J.
AGENTS 37 (John W. Pratt &
AND
PRINCIPALS
in
The Economics of Agency,
and
Assessment
An
Theory:
Agency
M. Eisenhardt,
TheZeckhauser eds., 1985); Kathleen
the
and
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems
Review, 14 ACAD. MGM-r. REV. 57 (1989);
An
SanfordJ. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart,
(1980);
ory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288
(1983).
7
51 ECONOMETRICA
Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,
43-45.
at
86,
note
87 Arrow, supra
88 See TIROLE, supra note 13, at 16-17.
to occur not only when agents work
89 In the literature, shirking is understood
on less important, but easier to perform,
few hours, but also when they spend time
activities. Id. at 16.
which thrives
is beloved by the business media,
90 This category of agency costs
compensation
excessive
have theorized that
on reports of business excesses. Yet some
See
smaller categories of agency costs.
the
of
one
be
actually
and self-dealing may

20071

BUSINESS

OUTSOURCING

AND

THE AGENCY

COST PROBLEM

975

decisions solely to protect her job. For instance, she may invest in
arcane derivative contracts-not because these are a sound investment for the principal, but rather because the net position is complicated, making it difficult for the billionaire to fire the agent.9 1 Finally,
the agent may take action that is either too conservative or too risky in
order to achieve personal aims. For example, she may invest the
money in a risk-free savings account, instead of in stocks or bonds, to
protect her job by never losing money.9 2 On the other hand, in certain situations, an agent may engage in extremely risky behavior that
harms the principal. For example, if the money manager faces the
threat of imminent termination for poor investment performance, she
might be willing to place a net present value negative bet in order to
juice her returns, or "gamble for resurrection." 9
Principals are often aware of these problems, and they may take
steps to counter potential abuses. For example, they may demand frequent meetings or reports in order to understand how an agent uses
her discretion. Or a principal may hire an independent third party to
monitor an agent in an attempt to safeguard that the agent acts in the
principal's best interest. 94 The principal may also negotiate contract
provisions that seek to align the interests of both parties. 95 In some
cases, agents may also wish to make bonding expenditures to prove
that they will not behave opportunistically. 96 But all of these actions
cost money, and ultimately they will not fully remove the information
Beyond Irrelevance: Why Companies' FinancialStructure Matters After All, ECONOMIST, Feb.
11, 2006, at 74.
91 In the corporate context, notable entrenchment strategies involve manipulating performance metrics to obscure poor results or resisting mergers that might lead
to management turnover. See TIROLE, supra note 13, at 17; Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-SpecificInvestments, 25 J. FIN.
ECON. 123, 134-36 (1989).
92 Similarly, corporate agents are often criticized for steering decisions toward
excessively safe projects. TtROLE, supra note 13, at 17.
93 Id. For example, in desperate times, the agent may be tempted to take the
billionaire's money to Las Vegas and place it on the roulette wheel (a negative net
present value transaction-a wager on black, for instance, earns an expected ninetyfour cents for every dollar bet). If the gamble pays off, she may keep her job; and if it
fails, she would have been fired anyway. In analogous contexts, an agent might be
willing to take much more risk than a principal.
94 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 325.
95 See Arrow, supra note 86, at 43-44; Eisenhardt, supra note 86, at 59-60; Fama,
supra note 86, at 292.
96 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308 ("[lIn some situations it will pay
the agent to expend resources ... to guarantee that he will not take certain actions
which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if
he does take such actions."). Examples of these bonding costs include contractual

.......
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A complete
and principal
asymmetries that exist between agent
these
includes
therefore,
understanding of the agency cost problem,
forethe
with
expenses, along
incremental monitoring and bonding agent decisions.9 8
suboptimal
gone economic value from
most often in the corpoAgency cost theories have been raised
dominate much of the scholarrate context, and they have come to
99
the corporation as a "nexus of
ship in this area. This work models
participants, including
contracts" between many different economic
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how agency distortions might
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the typical focus is on
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agency costs arising from the relationship
equity interest, are viewed
managers. 0 0 Shareholders, with a residual
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as the principals. The various executives
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not perfect,

by the
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323.
at
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infinite
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avenue
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each of which might provide
is to transfer full ownercompletely
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Indeed, the only way to remove these
312-13, 316-17; Robert
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e.g.,
See,
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ship of the property to the controlling
Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 621, 637 (2005).
H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust
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12, at 308 (defining agency costs as
98 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note
loss
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costs,
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of the principal's monitoring costs,
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experienced
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in
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interests).
agent
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result
a
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principal"
on a $25 Million Bet: Venture Capital,Agency
Risk
Managing
99 See Robert P. Bartlett,
54 UCLA L. REv. 37, 48 (2006) (noting
Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation,
contemprimary analytical framework used in
that agency cost models "define [I the
of
theories
cost
supranote 97, at 623 ("Agency
porary corporate scholarship"); Sitkoff,
economics.").
of corporate law and
the firm dominate the modern literature
Daniel Fischel take this angle in their
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100 For example, Frank
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take agency cost distortions into account
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In fact, balancing the Coasean benefits of centralized cor-

porate control 0 3 against the resulting agency costs has become a pivotal tension for corporate law scholars.1 0 4 Important work has also
surfaced in the debt financing context-where the lender is viewed as
principal and the borrowing firm is viewed as agent 0 -- and in other
10 6
capital structure decisions.
Agency costs might also arise, however, between other corporate
stakeholders.10 7 And business outsourcing, in particular, offers an
intriguing perspective on the problem.
B.

The Agency Costs of Business Outsourcing

A business outsourcing project will sometimes transfer corporate
assets and employees to an outsourcing vendor-who will continue to
use these resources to conduct economic activity on behalf of the client. " 8 In other cases, the existing assets and workers are replaced
capital); Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 290-91. But this argument does not mean
that agency cost theories of the firm are no longer relevant. Blair & Stout, supra, at 38
("[TI he principal-agent model still has great influence .... "); Ribstein, supra note 64
(using agency theory to assess capital lock-in in a corporation).
102 See TIRoLE, supranote 13, at 15-43. For example, the work here has supported
(and later critiqued) the use of stock options and other incentive-based compensation
schemes for corporate executives. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 13, at 121-32;
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 31 0-11 :Jensen & Murphy, supra note 14, at 243;
Schizer, supra note 14, at 448-49. Agency theory has also led to extensive normative
debate about the appropriate division between board and shareholder control. See
Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 616-27; Bebchuk, supra note 18, at 850-92.
103 See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
104 SeeJACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 227.
105 Much of the discussion focuses on the distortions that arise when a borrowing
firm (the agent) controls the money of a creditor (the principal). Problems arising
between a principal-lender and manager-agent are also explored. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 12, at 337-39. In both contexts, the analysis differs from shareholder-CEO agency models because borrowers are not legally required to extend fiduciary duties to lenders. Thus most of the techniques for mitigating agency costs are
contractual in nature. See Amihud et al., supranote 17, at 454-56; Kahan & Yermack,
supra note 17, at 138.
106 The structure of venture capital finance, for instance, offers a rich context for
transaction cost economics and agency theory. See, e.g., PAUL GoMpErs & JosH LERNER, THE VErURE CAPITAL CYCLE 174-75 (2004); Bartlett, supra note 99, at 48-61;
Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital
Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 59 (Michael Whincop
ed., 2001); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-CapitalOrganizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 493-503 (1990).
107 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 309.
108 For example, a large outsourcing project in 2002 transferred about 4000
employees fromJP Morgan (the client) to IBM (the outsourcing vendor). See Charles
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with those of the vendor. But the defining feature of an outsourcing
transaction is that a firm contracts with another entity to take over
activity that was previously produced inside the firm.
Outsourcing deals thus generate agency risk under a very familiar
logic: the entity that controls a business activity does not ultimately
"own" the economic result. Just like a CEO manages the property of
shareholders-or like a borrower manages the money of a lender-an
outsourcing vendor manages the business activity of an outsourcing
firm. 10 9 This places the vendor in an agency position, where it might
have incentives to cut corners, take excessive risks, or engage in other
forms of self-dealing. Unless resources are spent on monitoring,
bonding, or other contractual protection, business outsourcing
breeds a host of distorted incentives.
For example, in a typical call center outsourcing project, the vendor decides who to hire and how it will train these employees. Similarly, it decides when to replace aging capital with more efficient
technology. And the vendor takes charge of quality control to ensure
that employees are polite on the phones and adept at solving callers'
problems. But the outsourcing client takes the fallout from many of
these choices. If the vendor hires rude callers who chase away loyal
customers, then the client loses business. If the caller misses obvious
sales opportunities, then the client foregoes the revenue.
Of course, the outsourcing vendor might ultimately be accountable for shoddy work if the client decides not to renew a contract or if
Forelle, Bank Scraps Dollars 5bn IBM IT Deal, FIN. TiMES, Sep. 16, 2004, at 32. When
the project collapsed a few years later, all 4000 employees were moved back to JP
Morgan. id.
109 Jensen & Meckling, supranote 12, at 325. The analysis differs slightly from the

typical corporate model because the outsourcing firm, as a whole, is viewed as principal and the outsourcing vendor is seen as agent. This is analogous to the agency
framework used in lending transactions, which also views entire firms as agent and

principal: the lending party is viewed as principal, and the borrowing firm is viewed as
agent. See supra note 17. It is interesting to note that more sophisticated models
might consider agency distortions arising between multiple corporate stakeholdersincluding suppliers, owners, managers, and the like. Robert Bartlett, for example, has
recently demonstrated how agency distortions can occur simultaneously in the corpo-

rate context-between shareholder and manager, and between shareholder and
shareholder. See Bartlett, supra note 99, at 56-61. One possible extension of this
Article, therefore, would involve a more detailed look inside outsourcing firms and

vendor firms to consider agency distortions among other stakeholders. For example,
an outsourcing firm's managers might have distorted incentives to outsource too
much activity (as a form of shirking) or too little activity (as a way to preserve corporate complexity and their jobs). Similarly, there are likely to be complex incentives

between an outsourcing vendor's employees and managers.
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110 But
that this vendor shirks.
word gets out to other potential clients
aware that the
be meted out if clients become

punishment will only
Most outsourcing relationships
vendor is engaged in selfish behavior.
and the client is unlikely to
are rife with asymmetrical information,
about-every potential abuse.
guard against-or even know
agency problems might
Indeed, any of the previously mentioned
Shirking may be the most
occur in an outsourcing relationship."'
is far away, vendors may be tempted
obvious risk; when the principal
11 2 But an outsourcing vendor might also
to ease off just a little bit.
For
through a myriad of techniques.
pursue excessive compensation
contracts and buy fancy equipment.
example, it might write cost-plus
yet hire unskilled labor. SimiOr it might write fixed-price contracts
meaningful competition for contract
larly, a vendor may try to avoid
up excessively confusing documentation
renewals-perhaps by setting
13 Finally, vendors may incur unwarranted
of their business processes.1
that the outsourcing principal
risks in their project execution-risks
control of the activity.
would never tolerate if it kept
incident at the prestigious UniConsider, for example, a recent
the
(UCSF) Medical Center. Near
versity of California San Francisco
email
threatening
a
was startled by
end of 2003, an employee at UCSF
1 4 Ms. Baloch
Lubna Baloch.
from a woman in Pakistan named
who
from someone named Tom Spires,
wanted help collecting money
verbal doctor notes for UCSF
had apparently hired her to transcribe
be
records are out in the open to
patient medical files. 'Your patient
and
person
you better track that
exposed," the email started. "[Slo
I will expose all the voice files and
make him pay my dues or otherwise
whether
considers similar questions by asking
110 The corporate agency literature
firm,
another
at
or to take a CEO position
86, at
a CEO's desire to renew her contract,
note
supra
Fama,
e.g.,
See,
behavior.
might serve as a check on opportunistic
of any team, may not suffer any immedicoach
the
like
firm,
a
of
292 ("The manager
but the
the current performance of his team,
a
ate gain or loss in current wages from
manager
the
gives
this
his future wages, and
success or failure of the team impacts
stake in the success of the team.").
text.
11 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying
known to
CEO of JP Morgan Chase, has been
112 Jamie Dimon, the high-profile
outsourcreason. In his words, "when you're
criticize business outsourcing for this
Shawn
We want patriots, not mercenaries."
ing. . . people don't care that much.
64.
at
3, 2006,

FORTUNE, Apr.
Tully, In This Corner!Jamie Dimon,
coopto minimize this problem by negotiating
seek
often
113 Outsourcing clients
in the event
firms
new
to
projects
to help transition
eration clauses requiring vendors
a vendor will
are not freely given, and presumably
terms
these
But
of termination.
rights.
cooperation
for
other benefit-in exchange
charge more-or demand some
Risk,
Privacy
Highlight
Offshore: Outsourced UCSF Notes
114 See David Lazarus, Looking
Al.
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2004, at
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patient records of [two different] UCSF campuses on the Internet."
As a chilling exclamation point, she attached voice recordings and full
1
text copies of private discharge summaries for two UCSF patients. 5
The message was both disturbing and puzzling. Disturbing for
the obvious reasons, and puzzling because UCSF had outsourced the
transcription of medical records to a nearby company in the Bay
Area-not to an overseas vendor.' 16 No one had heard of Tom
Spires, and UCSF wondered whether these threats were for real.
As UCSF investigated the situation, it found that the medical transcription work had been subcontracted from the Bay Area vendor to a
woman in Florida.' 1 7 She had passed it on to Tom Spires,' 18 who had
finally sent the assignment on to Ms. Baloch in Pakistan. When Tom
Spires stopped paying for the work, Ms. Baloch decided to threaten
UCSF to recover her fees. Ultimately, UCSF paid her for the work,
Ms. Baloch rescinded her threats, and the sensitive medical files were
not exposed.1 1 9
Yet while the worst outcome was avoided, the Lubna Baloch story
still offers a haunting collection of outsourcing agency costs. First, the
woman in Florida-and perhaps also the Bay Area vendor-shirked
on their performance responsibilities by sending the work elsewhere
instead of transcribing the medical files themselves. 120 Similarly, both
agents seemed negligent in their subcontractor selection process and
failed to supervise the work as closely as UCSF would have preferred.
In addition, the Florida vendor engaged in self-dealing by sending the
work overseas and pocketing the wage arbitrage herself. And this
introduced risks that UCSF appeared unwilling to take: The medical
center was comfortable sharing sensitive information with domestic
outsourcing vendors, but it may not have wanted to release medical
21
records to a small, international vendor.'
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Complicating matters even further, it is uncertain whether Tom Spires really
exists or whether he is a fictional person established by the woman in Florida to hide
her efforts to send the medical information outside of the United States. See id.
119 Id.
120 Apparently the Bay Area vendor's contract with UCSF allowed it to subcontract
the work to other firms-as long as it was performed in the United States. Id. Thus,
any shirking by the Bay Area vendor would come from their failure to manage where
the work was conducted-that is, spending its time on easy actions instead of important ones. See supra note 89.
121 Part of UCSF's reluctance to move work overseas may have been caused by
federal legislation affecting the use and treatment of personally identifiable health
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Of course, agency problems of this sort might arise in any longterm contract involving asymmetrical information. 22 The regular
supplier of raw materials for a manufacturing company, for instance,
could be viewed as an agent because the quality of its inputs will affect
the manufacturer's final product. Similarly, a firm signing a longterm sales or distribution contract faces risks that the distributor will
not take sensible efforts to move its products. 2-1 It is particularly
interesting to study agency problems in the outsourcing context, however, because it sheds new light on the way that firms are organizing
1 24
their economic activity in a rapidly changing world.
Previous scholarship has recognized the agency costs of business
outsourcing, 2 5 but most research deals with theoretical models of
optimal contract design12 6 or with technical, practitioner-oriented
care information. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7c (2000).
122 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 327-29.
123 This is one reason why large food companies sometimes hire their own
employees to stock and organize grocery store shelves. Or, to take a related example,
the agency problem is sometimes illustrated by the relationship between a principal
who is selling a home and the realtor marketing the property. See EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 100, at 91; Sitkoff, supra note 97, at 636-37. Selling agents may
refuse to take worthwhile efforts to increase the final selling price of a home because
they are compensated with just a small percentage of the profits. Id.
124 A further reason to study agency costs in the outsourcing context relates to the
fact that agents take over chunks of business activity formerly conducted by their principals. This means that principals might be especially mindful of agency risk-especially if previous experience in the activity reduces cognitive biases that limit
recognition of potential agency distortions. If so, outsourcing principals may have a
better sense of what good agent behavior looks like, allowing them to structure a
contract more carefully or to keep a sharp eye open for suboptimal decisions. See
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 Sci. 1124, 1130 (1974). For general discussions of cognitive biases in the economic analysis of law, see Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1489-1508 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. Ruv. 1051, 1084-102 (2000).
125 Jensen and Meckling even alluded to supplier agency risk in their seminal 1976
article. SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 310.
126 See, e.g., Sankaranarayanan & Sundararajan, supra note 21, at 3 (modeling outsourcing agency costs as one factor in the decision to conduct activity within the firm
in light of falling interaction costs); 0. Zeynep Ak in et al., Call Center Outsourcing
Contract Design and Choice (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-fdvl/bio/OUT31-1004.pdf
(formally exploring
several co-sourcing structures in the call-center context); Francis Xavier, Abstract,
Determinants of Inter Firm ContractualRelations: A Case of Indian Software Industry (Univ.
of Hyderabad, Dep't of Econ. Working Paper Series, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=858344 (assessing theories of optimal outsourcing contract terms); Conglei Zhang et
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advice.12 7 There has been surprisingly little work offering a descriptive account of outsourcing contracts and the strategies that parties
take to mitigate agency risk.
Yet this analysis is important because outsourcing firms do find it
worthwhile to seek contractual protection against agent misbehavior.
As in other agency contexts, an outsourcing principal will negotiate a
variety of structures and terms to monitor and prevent vendor abuses.
And, as the next Part will illustrate, these methods can be especially
intriguing because firms often seem willing to make exceptional
efforts to solve the agency cost problem.
III.

MITIGATING AGENCY RISK IN THE BUSINESS
OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIP

No matter how hard they try, parties establishing an outsourcing
relationship cannot write a perfect contract. Asymmetrical information will persist, and agents might take advantage of unexpected
events to secure personal gains at the principal's expense. But the
firms can-and do-take steps to detect and prevent agency risk.
This Part first shows how the structure and terms of a typical outsourcing project operate to mitigate the agency cost problem. It then discusses the more general proposition that falling interaction costs are
making it easier to pursue these strategies to drive down the agency
costs of outsourcing. Taken together, this work offers a secondary
explanation-beyond garnering access to cheap production markets-for the contemporary rise of business outsourcing.
A.

Strategies to Minimize Agency Costs

Outsourcing projects are exceptionally complex, and, as with
other major corporate transactions, it can be difficult to generalize
broad principles from specific deals. Nevertheless, many contracts are
structured in a similar manner-perhaps because these arrangements
prove effective for defining and aligning an outsourcing relationship,
al., OutsourcingSoftware Development: A Contract Theoretic Analysis (Univ. of Wash., 15th
Annual Workshop on Info. Techs. & Sys. (WITS), 2005), availableat http://ssrn.com/
abstract=883114 (modeling agency problems in software outsourcing contracts under
a fixed price or time and materials arrangement).
127 See, e.g., Peter Brown, Crisis Management in OutsourcingDeals, 859 PLI/Pat 169
(2006); John F. Delaney, Outsourcing Transactions:Strategiesfor Success, 844 PLI/Pat 85
(2005); Rebecca S. Eisner, Wake Up and Smell the Privacy Issues: Recognizing and Managing Privacy Issues in Outsourcing (Including Offshore), 866 PLI/Pat 95 (2006); Karen K.
Harris, Issues for Healthcare Companies When Contracting with ASPs, 19 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 569 (2001).
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and perhaps because the lawyers drafting the deals rely on the precedent of contractual boilerplate.' 2 8 In any case, as with other financial
contracts,1 29 it is possible to study a basic structure common to most
outsourcing transactions and to draw upon representative deals to
illustrate interesting terms.3 0 Furthermore, some firms have pursued
notable steps to mitigate agency risk, and these efforts are worth analyzing in some detail-even if they differ somewhat from a typical outsourcing contract.
More specifically, I will consider five major strategies that firms
take to mitigate the agency costs of outsourcing: (1) staged commitment through an interlocking, multi-contractual framework; (2) the
use of redundant agents or the retention of duplicate activity within
the firm; (3) incentive compatible compensation; (4) explicit moni128 For a recent discussion of the benefits and concerns presented by contractual
boilerplate, see "Boilerplate": Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium, 104 MICH. L.
REv. 821 (2006).
129 For analogous work in other business contexts, see, for example, Stephen J.
Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An EmpiricalExamination of
Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 931 (2004) (analyzing sovereign bond contracts);
Kahan & Yermack, supra note 17, at 138-48 (analyzing bond indentures); Steven N.
Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Characteristics,Contracts, and Actions: Evidence From Venture
CapitalistAnalyses, 59J. FIN. 2177, 2208 (2004) (analyzing venture capital contracts);
Klausner & Litvak, supra note 106, at 56-58 (same); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Strategic Alliances, 2005 U. ILL. L. Ruv. 303, 313-16 (2005) [hereinafter Smith,
StrategicAlliances] (analyzing business alliances); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of
Venture Capital,53 UCLA L. Rxv. 315, 337-55 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Venture Capital] (analyzing venture capital contracts).
130 Most of the analysis in this Part is based on a review of contracts released in
public SEC filings. Specifically, I reviewed 830 contracts for services, collected by an
online aggregator of SEC contracts (ONECLE). From this large collection of service
contracts, approximately eighty-nine documents involved outsourcing projects
(including amendments and supplemental work orders), and this subset of agreements was analyzed in more detail. These contracts date from 1996 to 2006 and are
available at http://contracts.onecle.com/type/4.shtml. I believe that this collection
of business outsourcing contracts offers a meaningful basis for qualitative analysis of
the typical efforts taken to deal with the agency cost problem. I have also supplemented this analysis with other research to illustrate some specific risk mitigation
strategies. I have resisted, however, the urge to draw quantitative conclusions from
this sample (such as the percentage of firms employing various risk mitigation techniques) due to potential selection biases. In particular, SEC disclosure requirements
in this area are not clear, and I believe that some firms seek to keep their outsourcing
transactions secret because they fear that public announcement might lead to internal morale problems, customer revolt, or political pressures. Furthermore, the fact
that these agreements span multiple contracts is problematic. See infra notes 131-41
and accompanying text. Parties will often disclose only a few of the interlocking contracts, and it is difficult to know when the complete transactional framework is
compiled.
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toring and control rights; and (5) "for cause" and "for convenience"
exit rights.
1. Staged Contractual Commitment
Outsourcing projects are typically structured as a complicated
array of overlapping contracts. In part, this may be because it is costly
to negotiate and draft detailed contract terms. 13' Outsourcing relationships are known to take frequent twists and turns, and this uncertain path progression makes it difficult to spell out the entire scope of
commitment up front. Parties may be better off waiting until important contingencies play out before fully documenting their
relationship.
There is a second reason, however, why an outsourcing firm may
wish to proceed in this manner. Multiple, asynchronous contracts
allow firms to stage their commitment, freeing them to reduce the
scope of a project if hints of vendor opportunism arise. In this way,
the use of sequential commitment parallels a technique used by venture capital firms to mitigate agency risk by staging their investment in
target companies.' 32 Just as a VC investor commits slowly via multiple
funding rounds-each round contingent upon the achievement of
business milestones' 33 -an outsourcing firm can stage its contractual
commitment by delaying detailed specification of scope and performance requirements. To understand how this staged commitment
works, consider the interactions between the four primary contracts
used in an outsourcing project: the confidentiality agreement, the
master agreement, the statements of work, and the service level
agreement.
First, during the initial negotiations, the parties will often sign a
confidentiality agreement to protect business information of both client and vendor. This is typically structured as a stand-alone contract,
131 See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX.
L. REv. 1581 (2005) (describing the costs involved in contract drafting and interpreta-

tion); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 60, at 594-95 (discussing how all contracts are
incomplete because it is costly to specify every potential contingency). I have contended elsewhere that parties may also draft vague or incomplete contracts for other
reasons. See George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90

L. REV. 1664, 1669 (2006) (arguing that a vague term may confer an embedded
option to either party).
MINN.

132 See Bartlett, supra note 99, at 52-53; Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture
Capital Market: Lessons From the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1078-81

(2003); Klausner & Litvak, supra note 106, at 59.
133

Gilson, supra note 132, at 1073.
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signed in advance of the other deal documents,13 4 These confidentiality agreements do not differ significantly from those used in other
13 5
business transactions, and I will not discuss them in detail.
The second deal document is called the master agreement, sometimes referred to as the framework agreement. This contract provides
an overview of the anticipated relationship and describes the business
goals in fairly broad strokes. Typically, it will also set a timeline for
moving the project forward and provide a governance structureincluding a schedule for joint meetings between high-level and operational-level personnel. It may also include other important terms,
such as a mechanism for resolving disputes and termination rights
and obligations. But while the master agreement can be quite
3 6
lengthy, it is usually silent on the exact work to be performed.1
A third collection of contracts, the statements of work, is subsequently negotiated to flesh out the project details. These documents
are numerous and often fairly short-sometimes just a few pagesand they will include detailed work orders and project functionality
requests. 13 7 The usual procedure is to have mid-level managers from
both parties, those closer to the nuts and bolts of the project, draft the
statements of work in accordance with the general guidelines and
timeline set by the master agreement. And because the scope of an
134 Confidentiality agreements are often signed first because it takes a long time to
write an outsourcing contract-and because the very process of negotiating the deal
will often reveal sensitive information. Furthermore, the outsourcing firm may be
bargaining simultaneously with several vendors, and everyone will want proprietary
information protected even if the deal falls through. Sometimes, however, confidentiality provisions are (unwisely) bundled into the master outsourcing agreement and
are not legally effective until the parties execute this contract.
135 The only obvious thing to note is that a confidentiality agreement protects
against the risk of an agent expropriating enumerated proprietary information as a
form of self-dealing. For further discussion of confidentially agreements, primarily in
the employment context, see Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality
Agreements Enforceable, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 627, 633-61 (1999).
136 See, e.g., Rosemary L. Gullikson, Statement of Work-The Road-Map of Services
Delivery, 880 PLI/Pat 173, 177 (2006); William A Tanenbaum, Revisiting Key Provisions
in Software and Outsourcing Agreements, J. INTERNET L., Mar. 2003, at 1.
137 Id. A nice example of the connection between the master agreement and
statement of work is found in a project where the John Wayne Cancer Institute outsourced data processing for clinical drug trials of a melanoma vaccine to a company
named Synteract. See Master Services Agreement Between CancerVax, The John
Wayne Cancer Institute, & Synteract, Inc., Jan. 22, 2002, available at http://contracts
.onecle.com/cancervax/wayne.svc.2002.01.22.shtml. The master agreement provides
a high level framework for the relationship, while a subsequent work order describes
the work to be performed: data input, quality control, database creation, adverse
event notification, statistical analysis, and other specific services. Id.
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outsourcing project may change frequently over time, it is also common to have many amendments and modifications to the statements

of work.
Finally, a fourth contract, the service level agreement (SLA), is
usually signed to govern the ongoing quality of project execution. 13 8
The SLA provides concrete performance metrics for the outsourcing

vendor to maintain during the life of the contract. It is usually quite
detailed; many SLAs run hundreds of pages. 139 Thus, while the statements of work govern what will be done, the SLA governs how well the
work will be performed. 14 0 Like the statements of work, the SLA may
14 1
be amended as the scope of the project evolves.
It may be easier to see how these four outsourcing contracts fit
together with a short example. In 1999, the energy giant BP Amoco
decided to outsource much of its human resources management services to a firm called Exult, 142 and the SEC filings surrounding this
transaction contain a particularly large amount of information.' 4 3
138 Like the other deal documents, the SLA is sometimes bundled with the master
agreement. But over time, as the project's scope changes with the statements of work,
SLAs will typically evolve to support these changes.
139 E.g., Amended and Restated Global Master Services Agreement Between Coors
Brewing Company & EDS Information Services, L.L.C.,Jan. 1, 2004, availableat http:/
/contracts.onecle.com/coors/eds.svc.2004.01.01 .shtml (hereinafter Coors / EDS
Contract] (running approximately 28,000 words).
140 For example, an agreement to outsource the storage and management of
Internet networking equipment (a "hosting" contract) may have statements of work
describing the type of servers and the space that will be allotted to the client. See
Robert D. Austin, Web and IT Hosting Facilities,Harvard Business School Technology
Note 9-601-134, at 7-8 (2003). It is the SLA, however, that typically guarantees specific perfornance measures, such as packet transmission rates, bit-loss frequency,
response times for service calls, and so on. Id.
141 Similarly, the parties may plan to renegotiate service levels over time. For
instance, the contract between EDS and Coors Brewing Co. provides that "[alt the
following intervals the Parties shall jointly review all then-applicable Service Levels...
and adjust them to reflect any improved performance capabilities associated with
advances in the technology and methods used to perform the Services." Coors/EDS
Contract, supra note 139, § 4.2(a).
142 For an excellent overview of human resources outsourcing and further background on the BP Amoco deal, see generally Paul S. Adler, Outsourcing: A Framework and the Case of Human Resource Management (Oct. 2, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract317502. Exult was subsequently
acquired by Hewitt Associates in 2004. Hewitt Associates to Acquire Exult A Rival, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2004, at C4.

143 See Framework Agreement Between BP Amoco P.L.C. & Exult, Inc., Dec. 7,
1999, available at http://contracts.onecle.com/exult/bpamoco.svc.1999.12.07.shtml
[hereinafter BP Amoco / Exult Framework Agreement]. Very similar master service
agreements were also executed on the same day between Exult and subsidiaries of BP
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description of the project,
The master agreement provides a general
nebulous, goals such as
which includes ambitious, though
processes and employee
"[a]utomation of relevant transactional
of web-enabled human resources
access through the implementation
of human resources transsupport," "[c]onsolidation and integration
Client Service Centres," and
actional processing support into third party service providers."1 44
of
"[r]ationalisation and integration
a timetable for Exult to submit
The master agreement also sets out
resources support and for both
detailed plans to provide this human
4 5 It then goes into
these plans.'
parties to conduct due diligence of
paid, how the project will be govgreat detail on how Exult will be
which employees will be trans1 46
erned, how disputes will be resolved,
general terms.
ferred to Exult, and other
vague on the exact
But the master agreement is exceptionally
BP Amoco. One appendix rattles
activities that Exult will perform for
like training, HR strategy,
off about twenty different services-things
records, payroll, recruiting, severlabor relations, managing employee
or three paragraph description
14 7
ance, and so on-and provides a two
Exult and BP Amoco.
between
divided
be
will
of how each activity
148 and the true scope
ambiguous,
These descriptions are remarkably
when the detailed statements of
of the project will only come to light
United Kingdom. See US Country Agreement
Amoco in the United States and the
Inc., Dec. 7, 1999, available at http://contracts.
Between BP America, Inc. & Exult 9 9 12
Between
. .07.shtmi; UK Country Agreement
onecle.com/exult/bpamerica.svc.19
Dec. 7, 1999, availableat http://contracts.onecle.
BP International, Ltd. & Exult, Ltd.,
com/exult/bpintl.svc. 1999.12.07.shtml.
Agreement, supra note 143, preamble.
144 BP Amoco / Exult Framework
145 Id. §§ 2, 4.
master agreement also contains confidentiality
146 Id. §§ 2, 8, 9, 16, 25, 28. The
confidentiwhether the parties signed a separate
provisions. Id. § 14. I do not know
master agreement.
ality agreement before negotiating this
A.
sched.
147 Id. at 63
for the first service, training, the agreement
148 For example, under the heading
runs as follows:
needs assessment, course/materials
Training as a process includes training
of training and training
conduct
development, logistics co-ordination,
assessment and post training followleader selection, training effectiveness
traditional classroom, self-study,
up. Delivery of training materials includes
delivery mechanisms.
training
party
computer-aided training and third
policies, develop and
and
strategies
[BP Amoco] shall develop training
needs analyses and assess the cost/benedeliver training programs based on
administer course schedules, registrafit of training programs. Exult shall
Exult shall also administer
tion, confirmations and training materials.
tuition reimbursement.
and
attendee evaluations of training programs
Id. at 64-65.
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work and the SLAs are subsequently negotiated by project managers
at BP Amoco and Exult.
It is this delay between high-level master agreements and actionable statements of work that allows an outsourcing firm to stage its
commitment-and thereby mitigate the risk of vendor opportunism.
The master agreement may set out the contemplated scope of a project, but the devil is always in the details. A principal detecting any
sign of poor performance, or losing trust in the vendor, will usually
have ample leeway to scale back commitment as additional statements
of work are drafted.
In addition, the parties will sometimes use more direct contractual methods to stage their commitment. For instance, many outsourcing contracts have a limited life, typically five to ten years.1 49
This provides another check on vendor opportunism: an imminent
renewal decision by the principal may keep some agents from misbehaving. 50 Other outsourcing projects use contracts that are limited
in geographic scope but dangle the possibility of future expansion. In
its deal with Exult, for example, BP Amoco agrees to initially outsource human resource services only in the United States and the
United Kingdom. t 51 But it also sets up procedures for expanding the
project to other countries at a later time. 152 These types of provisions
are explicit mechanisms for reducing agency risk through staged
commitment.
There is one obvious problem, however, with using a staged commitment strategy to mitigate agency risk: It may be hard for the principal to detect poor performance. The hallmark of agency costs, after
all, is asymmetric information,' 5 and it can be difficult to determine
whether an agent is doing anything wrong. Even when there are obvious signs of poor performance, the agent vendor may blame the
problems on external market conditions. Thus, there must be some
way to measure, at the back end of a period, whether to move on to
the next stage of commitment.
149 For an example of this, see infranote 187 (describing a contract with an anticipated seven-year term).
150 On this note, IBM, one the of largest technology outsourcing vendors, has
recently announced that "smaller and shorter contracts are more profitable and preferred by customers." Charles Forelle, IBM Turns to Smaller Service Deals, WALL ST. J.,

Feb. 24, 2005, at A3. If so, one possible explanation for the greater profitability of
shorter contracts is that they create less costly agency problems-thereby decreasing
the need for IBM to discount prices for this risk.
151 BP Amoco / Exult Framework Agreement, supra note 143, § 2.
152 Id.
153 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Venture capitalists typically address this problem by placing performance expectations on future funding. 15 4 In an outsourcing project, the service level agreement can act in a similar manner. As
mentioned, the parties will typically take great efforts to define the
exact scope of duties in the work statements and to spell out metrics
for acceptable performance in the SLA. If SLA performance measures fall short of expectations, then the principal will have a basis for
55
abandoning the next stage of an outsourcing project.
Nevertheless, it can be challenging to set the right benchmarks in
the first place. And even with detailed performance metrics, it may be
hard for a principal to detect all forms of agent self-dealing. To
counter these concerns, outsourcing principals might turn to other
strategies, such as the employment of multiple agents or co-sourcing.
2.

Multiple Agents and Co-Sourcing

A second way to manage agency risk involves the use of multiple
agents and co-sourcing-that is, keeping some of the outsourced
activity within the firm. 56 By dividing a project into pieces and awarding each piece to different agents, principals can, in theory, introduce
an element of competition that will help them monitor the agents'
performance. Further, the agents will often be aware of this scrutiny,
and this knowledge may also prevent some misbehavior.
For instance, a firm outsourcing the hosting and management of
its networking infrastructure might divide the company in half and
award part of the project to one vendor and the rest to another. This
tactic gives the principal an automatic way to benchmark the performance of both agents: it can directly compare packet transmission rates,
bit-loss frequency, service call response rates, and the other relevant
metrics.15 7 This might help the principal identify hidden risks or
uncover agency distortions.
Consider the approach taken by one of India's largest mobile
phone companies, a firm named Bharti Airtel. As part of a fascinating
transition over the past few years, Bharti has outsourced nearly all of
its business activities-including technology infrastructure, IT ser154 See Bartlett, supra note 99, at 64-80; Klausner & Litvak, supra note 106. These
financial benchmarks may need to be adjusted with common sense, however, or they
will prove over- and under-inclusive.
155 Further, failure to meet SLA performance requirements may trigger financial
penalties or "for-cause" exit rights. See infra Part Il.A.5.
156 See Aklin et al.,
supra note 126, at 2 (defining co-sourcing).
157 For an explanation of these metrics, see Austin, supra note 140, at 3-4.
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vices, billing, provisioning, and so on-to other firms. 158 Recently, it

also decided to outsource its customer service centers, following this
strategy of multiple agents. After dividing operations into four
regions, Bharti hired a different vendor to handle the inbound service
calls of customers in each region. 15 9 This strategy gives Bharti a basis
for comparing the efficiency of each vendor. In some cases, Bharti
also assigned two vendors to a geographic region-to counter the
potential excuse that an agent's poor performance should be blamed
1 60
on market conditions.
Related to this strategy of using multiple agents, a principal will
161
sometimes benchmark performance by co-sourcing a project.
Under this approach, the principal simply outsources part of the
work, keeping a share of the activity within the firm. Co-sourcing also
allows the principal to pace the performance of agents, and it may
62
have added strategic benefits.
Continuing with the previous example, Bharti supplemented its
call center outsourcing strategy by keeping an in-house division to
perform the same work. 163 It uses the company-owned call center to
manage particularly important customers by performing an initial
screen on all incoming calls. High-value customers are routed to the
in-house service center, while all other customers are automatically
transferred to one of the four outsourcing vendors.164 This strategy
allows Bharti to retain control of the high-end customer experience,
and it also provides a reliable, internal benchmark on the perform16 5
ance of call-center agents.

Unfortunately, the use of multiple agents or co-sourcing comes
with a price. A firm may lose economies of scale by splitting an out158 Bharti's strategy is particularly interesting, because many of its deals have
involved "reverse offshore outsourcing," the movement of business activity from an
Indian principal to agents in the United States. See Rebecca Buckman, Outsourcing
with a Twist: Indian Phone Giant Bharti Sends Jobs to Western Firns in a MultinationalRole
Switch, WALL ST.J., Jan. 18, 2005, at Al; Ray Marcelo & Paul Taylor, IBM Turns Tables
on Indian Outsourcing, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2004, at 1.
159 See Balaka Baruah Aggarwal, Bharti's Outsourcing Innovation, DAT'AQuEST, Sep.
27, 2005, http://www.dqindia.com/content/industrymarket/2005/105092702.asp.
160 Id.
161 See Akin et al., supra note 126, at 2.
162 See, e.g., Noshir F. Kaka, Running a Customer Service Center in India: An Interview
With the Head of Operationsfor Dell India, MCGKNSE' Q., May 2006, http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article-abstract.aspx?ar=1779&L2=13&L3-13 (discussing Dell Computer's co-sourcing strategy).
163 See Aggarwal, supra note 159.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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sourcing project into several smaller chunks. Often, outsourcing vendors can bargain for higher fees when the size of the contract is
smaller.' 66 In addition, the principal will need to incur extra transaction costs to stitch together the outsourcing project. Instead of dealing with just one big partner, it will need to manage a collection of
smaller relationships and divide project responsibilities among the
vendors. Thus, like all other monitoring investments, there is a fundamental tension in the use of this strategy: adding more vendors
increases competitive pressure and mitigates agency risk, but it also
raises transaction and coordination costs. Furthermore, it may be
impossible to break up some outsourcing projects into meaningful
pieces. Some assignments may not have parallel processes-or may
not be divisible and measurable in a sensible way.
Nevertheless, under the right circumstances, it may be worth
trading additional monitoring costs for reduced agency distortions.
And if it is indeed becoming cheaper to coordinate activity between
multiple vendors-as I will soon argue 167 -then we might expect to
see more outsourcing principals using these structures.
3.

Incentive Compatible Compensation

A third strategy for mitigating outsourcing agency risk is to set a
compensation scheme that seeks to align vendors' economic interests
with those of the principal. Just as a corporation issues options to top
managers to focus their efforts on boosting stock prices,168 an outsourcing principal might negotiate incentive compatible compensation structures to narrow the agency gap. While these tactics may help
at the margins-and are thus worth understanding-it is important to
note that they will never fully solve the agency problem. Anything
short of transferring a complete ownership interest to the agent will
leave room for economic distortions. 169
Before turning to a few of these compensation strategies, let me
quickly point out the problems with standard ways of paying for outsourcing services. Consider two extreme compensation paradigms: a
time and materials contract, and a fixed price contract. 170 Time and
166 See Forelle, supra note 150.
167 See infra Part 1I1.B.
168 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 312-13; Jensen & Murphy, supra note
14, at 232-35.
169 See Sitkoff, supra note 97, at 637.
170 For additional discussion of the agency problems presented by time and materials and fixed price contracts, see Alexander j. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Timing
Problems in Contract Breach Decisions, 41 J.L. & ECON. 163, 187-93 (more formally
exploring agency costs in a fixed price contract).
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materials compensation, where the agent simply adds a markup to the
project's input costs, presents obvious agency problems. The vendor
has no incentive to tackle a project in a cost-effective manner because
she will be paid for shirking or other inefficient behavior. 17 1 A fixed
price contract, by contrast, transfers the pain of excessive input costs
to the vendor. But this paradigm raises other incentives to perform
shoddy work; the vendor might, for example, take excessive risks and
still get paid in full. Sometimes, an outsourcing principal will try a
compromise approach-by imposing a time and materials contract
with a maximum price cap-but this strategy just presents the con172
cerns of both payment schemes.
In place of these standard pricing strategies, some outsourcing
contracts are substituting incentive compatible compensation terms.
For example, they might award half of all cost savings below a specific
target to agent vendors or impose other "earn-out" requirements. 173
Other contracts require annual negotiation of compensation (a strategy similar to staged commitment) or impose fines if service levels
miss contractual requirements. In the outsourcing contract between
BP Amoco and Exult,1 74 for example, a project manager at Exult
admitted that "[w]e are obligated to certain performance levels ...
and we'd have to pay big penalties if we missed those levels." 175 Still
other contracts will pay vendors with the principal's stock to directly
align agent incentives. Many other compensation schemes might
serve similar purposes; the key is simply to focus the attention of both
parties on the same goals. But at the end of the day, these strategies
171 Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: PrivatizingForeign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 203-04
(2005) (discussing both types of arrangements in government contracting).
172 For example, a contract using this hybrid fee arrangement might pay the vendor a twenty percent markup on all time and material expenses-but limit the annual
payments to one million dollars at a maximum. Such an arrangement might
encourage the vendor to engage in excessive activity early in the year and to slash
activity later on (perhaps via excessive risk) as it approaches the one million dollar
cap. Neither incentives are in the principal's best interest. Similarly, the Bharti Airtel
deal, described supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text, pays call center vendors

on a per call basis, rather than on a per employee basis. Aggarwal, supra note 159.
This structure encourages vendors to focus on operating efficiency-rather than just
scaling up employees-but it may also reduce the quality of service by imposing more

time pressure on each call.
173 See David Craig & Paul Willmott, OutsourcingGrows Up, MCKINSEY
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article abstract.aspx?ar--1582.
174
175

See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
Adler, supra note 142 (manuscript at 20).

Q., Feb. 2006,
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will never eliminate agency risk completely-they can only influence
vendor behavior at the margins.
4.

Explicit Monitoring and Control Rights

Perhaps the most direct way to mitigate the agency costs of business outsourcing is to write contracts with explicit monitoring or control rights. Many transactions require vendors to participate in
extensive business audits that allow principals-or their designated
third parties-to come on site and inspect financial records and operating procedures. 1 76 In theory, these monitoring provisions should
reduce an agent's temptation to make self-interested decisions
because the principal will have a better chance at uncovering the bad
behavior.

177

Explicit control rights work in a similar, but ex ante, manner by
giving principals power over decisions that are typically delegated to
the agent. The scope of these rights will differ from transaction to
transaction, but a major outsourcing client may hold sway over important decisions such as employee hiring and training, equipment
upgrades, managerial ratios, the selection of subcontractors, and
other operating activities. 178 Sometimes this control comes through
contractual carve-outs allowing principals to veto particularly impor79
tant decisions rather than make direct decisions.1
The principal might also seek to exert control at a higher level by
taking an ownership interest in the agent. For example, in the BP
Amoco-Exult deal, BP bought eight percent of Exult's stock as a "sign
of good faith.""' Minority equity ownership will not give a principal
explicit control of the agent, but it may allow the principal to exert
176 E.g., Master Services Agreement Between Exult, Inc. & Bank of America Corp.,
Nov. 21, 2000, § 17, available at http://contracts.onece.com/exult/bofa.svc.2000.11
.21.shtml.
177 See Arrow, supra note 86, at 45-46; Fama, supra note 86, at 293; Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 12, at 323-25.
178 E.g., Master Agreement for Outsourcing Call Center Support Between Priceline.com LLC and Calltech Communication Inc., §§ 1, 3, 1998, available at http://
contracts.onecle.com/priceline/calltech.svc.1998.shtml [hereinafter Priceline.com /
Calltech Agreement] (dictating hours of operation, training requirements, and other
operating procedures). Contracts providing extensive principal control, sometimes
termed "virtual captive offshoring" arrangements, are discussed infra notes 212-18
and accompanying text.
179 Similar veto provisions are often used in debt contracts. See Amihud et al.,
supra note 17, at 464-65; Fischel, supra note 17, at 145.
180 Adler, supra note 142 (manuscript at 16). The quote is curiously ambiguous
on whether BP is demonstrating "good faith" to Exult or purchasing it from the
vendor.
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considerable influence.18 1 This type of control is similar to that
enjoyed by a venture capital investor-although VC firms will often
use preferred stock and other methods to exert influence even
beyond their proportional ownership in a firm. 8 2 Such extensive
control rights are much rarer in the business outsourcing context.
5.

Exit Rights

The last strategy for managing agency costs that I will discuss
involves exit rights, the legal power to terminate an outsourcing contract before the contemplated term expires. Exit rights raise an interesting tension-as they do in other corporate contexts' 3-because of
two competing concerns. On the one hand, allowing an outsourcing
8 4 If
principal to exit at will provides a check on vendor opportunism.
the principal detects poor quality work, excessive costs, or any other
problem, it can simply end the deal. In this sense, liberal exit rights
serve as the ultimate check on agency cost problems, and even the
threat of early termination may keep vendors in line.'8 5
But, on the other hand, an outsourcing vendor will often need to
incur relation-specific investments to take on new work, and it may
worry about writing an open-ended put option on the project.18 6 For
example, IBM, one of the world's largest technology outsourcing vendors, recently experienced a devastating loss when JP Morgan Chase
cancelled a five billion dollar outsourcing project just eighteen
181 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MIcH. L. REV.
520, 524, 585-89 (1990); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Signficance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 473-74 (1991); see also MARK ROE,
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 169-86 (1994) (discussing governance practices in
countries with a preponderance of equity blockholding).
182 For example, venture capital investors might seek dedicated board seats or
greater voting power than other shareholders. See Bartlett, supra note 99, at 53-54.
183 The right to exit an economic relationship-and the flip side of exit rights, the
power to "lock in" capital-has been discussed extensively in the legal literature. See,
e.g., Blair, supra note 64, at 441-55 (corporations); Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory
Approach to PartnerDissociation, 65 WAsti. U. L.Q. 357, 389-92 (1987) (partnerships);
Smith, StrategicAlliances, supra note 129, at 311-12 (business alliances); Smith, Venture
Capital, supra note 129, at 337-56 (venture capital finance).
184 See Smith, Strategic Alliances, supra note 129, at 311.
185 See id.
186 For those less fluent in options terminology, a put option is the right-but not
the obligation-to sell something at a given price. See RicHARD A. BREALFm, STEwART
C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 544 (8th ed. 2006);
JOHN C. HULL, FUNDAMENTALS OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS 263-81 (5th ed.
2005). Thus, granting unrestricted termination rights to an outsourcing firm essentially gives them a put on the project.

20071

BUSINESS

OUTSOURCING

AND

THE AGENCY

COST PROBLEM

995

8 7 Easy exit rights thus raise
months into a seven year contract.'
principals might use, or
another potential problem: outsourcing
to extort a better
to use, these exit rights opportunistically
threaten
1 88
deal.
exit rights are often one of
Because of these competing tensions,
in an outsourcing contract.
the most heavily negotiated provisions
define when and how a firm may
Parties typically take great pains to
set the financial consequences of
walk away from the project-and to
involves dual exit rights: termian early exit. The typical compromise
1 8 9 Under the "for
convenience.
nation for cause and termination for
exit the relationship if the agent
cause" track, a principal is entitled to
or if other problems
does not live up to service level requirements
track, a principal is entitled to
arise. 190 Under the "for convenience"
bad service, but it may need to
cancel the project without proof of
purchases or pay other financial
reimburse the agent for upfront asset
sup91 Under both tracks, the agent is usually required to
penalties.'

was pursudo so under the contract because IBM
187 JP Morgan Chase was free to
information
turn
to
hoped
it
which
under
ing a new services "on demand" strategy,
JP
electricity using pay-as-you-go arrangements.
or
gas
like
utility
a
into
technology
See
IBM.
for
client
in 2002 as a marquee
Morgan Chase signed up for the service
2004, at
15,
Jan.
J.,
ST.
WALL.
Pact,
Outsourcing
Daniel Golden, IBM Gets JP.Morgan
and
theJP Morgan deal was "by far the largest
that
executive
IBM
top
a
AIO (quoting
Sachs
Goldman
a
we've signed" and quoting
most comprehensive on-demand deal
and a key "reference account" for
high-profile"
"very
was
analyst that the contract
manage
Under the agreement, IBM would
evaluating the on-demand approach).
desks, data
help
centers,
data
including
most of the bank's core technology functions,
The deal
computing. Forelle, supra note 108.
and voice networks, and distributed
at any
project
outsourcing
could halt the
was structured, however, so thatJP Morgan
years. IBM
seven
least
at
for
last
to
time-although the contract was contemplated
and the
to supportJP Morgan's technology needs,
incurred large upfront investments
of JP
leadership
the
Jamie Dimon took over
partnership moved forward, But when
the
to
project-pointing
IBM
the
the plug on
Morgan, his team soon decided to pull
to excess
and
ownership,
IT
of
importance
high cost of the contract, the strategic
its "onMore recently, IBM has deemphasized
Id.
BankOne.
at
capacity
technology
risk
termination
shift
that
shorter projects
demand" strategy and has been pushing
back to clients. See supra note 150.
note 129, at 311.
188 See Smith, Strategic Alliances, supra
189 Id. at 346-50.
190 Id. at 304.
mutuality
exit rights of this sort might raise
191 Without financial penalty, liberal
would
requirement
faith
good
a
law-although
of obligation concerns in contract
FARNSALLAN
E.
to skirt the problem. See
most likely be read into the exit terms
ON
MURRAY
JR.,
MURRAY,
3.2 (4th ed. 2004);JOHN EDwARD
woRTH, CONTRACTS §§ 2.13,
ON
PERILLO
D
CALAMARI
2001); JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CONTRACTS 249-50 (4th ed.
has
party
a
1 am unaware of any situation where
CONTRACTS § 4.12 (5th ed. 2003).
contract along these lines.
attacked the validity of an outsourcing
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although the obligations may differ
port transition to another vendor,
between the two types of exit.
Priceline.com, the online
An outsourcing partnership between
vendor, provides a nice examtravel firm, and Calltech, a call center
to outIn 1998, Priceline decided
19 2 The deal
ple of a typical exit arrangement.
center work to Calltech.
source all of its inbound call
annual renewal unless notice was
would last for a year with automatic 193
Priceline then secured "for
a term.
provided prior to the end of
it to cancel the agreement if
cause" termination rights, allowing
obligations-as defined in the
Calltech failed to meet performance
financial
SLA-or if Calltech suffered
statements of work and the
rights,
exit
"for convenience"
94
problems.1 Priceline also negotiated
days notice. But if Priceline trigallowing termination with just ninety
to
an early termination fee designed
gered these rights, it would incur costs and expenses actually and rea"compensate CALLTECH for all
for personnel and equipment
sonably incurred by CALLTECH
.... -195 The agreement
engaged in providing Services to PRICELINE
to
Calltech to make good faith efforts
goes on, however, to require
that
these assets-and, interestingly,
discharge this fee by redeploying
Calltech
by
charged
at the total bill
the termination fee will be capped
1 96 The exit structure of this
during the month prior to termination.
dance to mitigate dual opportunism:
deal thus stages a complicated
thinks Calltech is behaving badly,
Priceline can threaten to leave if it
fee is
fee to do so, but the termination
but it must pay a termination
requirements.
limited by agent redeployment
a large outsourcing project can
Of course, the complexity of
is "for
determine whether termination
sometimes make it hard to
claim
A principal might unjustifiably
cause" or "for convenience."
of a
penalties
to avoid the financial
"for cause" termination in order
an agent may refuse to accept evi
convenience exit. And conversely,
9 7 Because language is
to cause.'
dence that bad behavior amounts
see Marcia Pledger, Netting New Business,
For general background on this deal,
Feb. 17, 2000, at IC.
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
(between PriceAgreement, supra note 178, § 5.1
Calltech
/
193 Priceline.com
Inc.).
line.com LLC and Calltech Communication
for cause termination include
triggering
problems
financial
194 Id. § 5.2. The
of financial distress. Id.
indicators
other
assets, and
bankruptcy, liabilities in excess of
195 Id. § 5.3.
deal. It
Priceline's clout in negotiating the
196 Id. This clause illustrates, perhaps,
month
one
exceed
would
from termination
is likely that the financial pain to Calltech
in billings.
Sciin litigation between Sears and Computer
the
197 This problem surfaced recently
cancel
to
sought
Sears
vendor. When
that
ences Corp. (CSC), a large outsourcing
and
convenience
for
really
that the exit was
project for cause, CSC countered
192

2007]

BUSINESS

OUTSOURCING

AND

THE AGENCY

COST PROBLEM

997

will never be able to set
ambiguous and context-dependent, parties
9 8 And the
distortion.1
upfront exit rights to govern every possible
according to the needs and
exact contours of these rights will differ
the overall framework of dual
bargaining power of both parties. But
sense when it is viewed as a
track termination does make economic
technique for mitigating agency risk.
menu of strategies for moniIn summary, then, firms have a large
They might draft detailed sertoring the agency costs of outsourcing.
commitment, employ
vice level requirements, stage contractual
provisions, negotiate liberal
redundant agents, secure broad control
is to be made of these collected
exit rights, or take other steps. What
agency risk?
techniques for detecting and preventing
Outsourcing
FallingMonitoring Costs as a Catalystfor
efforts to mitigate outIt is tempting to conclude that contractual
of the ordinary. Parties will,
sourcing agency risk are nothing out
their interests when forming an
after all, usually take steps to protect
agency relationships-includimportant economic association. Many
creditor and manager, maning those of shareholder and manager,
and promisor (of which
ager and employee, and promisee
detailed contracts to define peroutsourcing is simply a variant)-use
set control rights, and divide
formance obligations, allocate risks,
profits.
about the specific conFurthermore, there is nothing novel
transaction. Some of the strat20 0
tracting devices used in an outsourcing
99 or minority equity investment,
investment
20
staged
egies, such as
world of venture capital. i
the
from
directly
have been borrowed
B.

Possible
financial penalties. See Joseph R. Perone,
Sears was attempting to dodge large
23,
May
N.J.),
(Newark,
LEDGER
STAR
Fort Closing and Lawsuit Dog Computer Sciences,
BOSTON GLOBE, May
Home,
Comes
Outsourcing
2005, at 24; Robert Weisman, Technology
court
tried (unsuccessfully) to seal the appellate
29, 2005, at E3. Unusually, CSC also
Seal
to
Failed
Tried,
CSC
Sidebar:
See Carol Silwa,
record of this lawsuit as a trade secret.
http://www.comaputerworld
2005,
23,
May
Court Records on Appeal, COMPUTERWORLD,
.com/action/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleld-101909&intsrc=Article
_potsbot.
exit
presented by the cause-convenience
198 See supra note 131. Another concern
perto
incentives
agent
an
give
might
fee
framework is that a large for-convenience
to
order
that the principal can prove cause-in
form poorly-although not so poorly
fee.
pay the agent the convenience
induce the principal to terminate and
III.A.I.
199 See supra Part
text.
200 See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying
note 132, at 1078; Klausner &
supra
Gilson,
52-56;
at
99,
note
201 Bartlett, supra
Litvak, supra note 106, at 59-69.
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Other techniques are common in long-term supply contracts, 20 2
employment agreements (including high-level executive compensation contracts 20 3 ), bond indentures, 20 4 and other financing arrangements. And while the interplay between a master outsourcing
agreement, a service level agreement, and the statements of work can
be quite elaborate, I want to resist the argument that these contracts
are uniquely complex.
But it is worth considering whether it has become easier for outsourcing parties to use these contractual techniques to mitigate
agency risk-and if so, whether this has served as an additional catalyst for outsourcing. I would contend that the same forces opening
global markets are also making it easier and cheaper to monitor and
prevent the agency costs of outsourcing. Specifically, technology,
standardization of business processes, and plunging communication
costs are changing the cost-effectiveness of investments to monitor
agency risk.
I am not claiming that outsourcing trends are driven only by falling monitoring costs. Certainly a large part of the change has arisen
from a firm's desire to enjoy cheaper production. But there are really
two effects in play: a carrot and a stick. The conventional explanation
for the rise of business outsourcing focuses on the carrot-that is, on
the economic gains from moving business activity to cheaper marketbased production. 20 5 I am simply contending that the exact same
forces that have increased the size of the carrot are also increasing the
ease with which a principal can wield the stick to ward off agency
costs.
Consider, at least briefly, how macroeconomic forces are making
it easier for firms to employ contractual strategies that mitigate the
agency cost problem. First, cheaper communication costs and standardized business processes simplify the drafting of detailed work
descriptions and performance obligations. Obviously, it will cost less
to write a comprehensive (though still incomplete2 0 6 ) agreement
when expensive international phone calls and business trips are
replaced with distributed voice and video networks.
Second, the standardization of business processes allows parties
to pull performance criteria "off the rack" instead of haggling over the
right way to assess execution of the business activity. For example, the
202

See, e.g., Hviid, supra note 27, § 4200, at 47; Scott, supra note 27, at 2012-15.

203

BESCHUu & FRImE,

204
205
206

See Amihud et al., supra note 17, at 453-56; Fischel, supra note 17, at 135-37.
See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.

supra note 13; Jensen & Murphy, supra note 14, at 227-42.
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an internet hosting project are
metrics to appraise performance in
packet transmission rates, bit-loss
now routinely defined to include
20 7
This makes it
calls, and so on.
frequency, response rates for service
to govern this type of outeasier to draft a service level agreement
addition to economizing drafting
sourcing project. Furthermore, in
efforts to monitor compliance
costs, standardized metrics simplify
Firms need not design cuswith these SLAs once they are in place.
every project. Of course, most busitomized monitoring processes for
even when they are, it
ness processes are not fully commoditized-and
there are signs of
20 8
still costs something to monitor performance-but
in many activities.
increasing standardization
technology, and standardThird, cheaper communication, better
to design and coordinate multiized business processes make it easier
of an outsourced activity under
ple agent structures or to leave part
for example, would find it more
the principal's control. Bharti Airtel,
different service regions if technoldifficult to divide India into four
to the
a call's origin and quickly route it
ogy did not exist to identify
it
make
costs
20 9 Similarly, plunging interaction
optimal destination.
resources support project,
easier to chop a software project, a human
pieces, to give each
different
many
or a drug discovery project into
stitch the pieces together again on
piece to a different agent, and to
this use of multiple agents allows
the back end. As described earlier,
and
agency risk through competition
firms to reduce
210
benchmarking.
principals use incentive comFinally, falling interaction costs help
and exit provisions more effecpatible compensation, control rights,
metrics make it easier to choose the
tively. For example, standardized
will align compensation with agent
key performance indicators that
internet hosting example, fees will
incentives. To continue with the
rates or bit-loss frequenoften be adjusted when packet transmission
requirements. Similarly, princicies fall short of stated performance
use "for-cause" termination clauses
pals will find it easier to draft and
taken off the shelf. And they will
when the relevant metrics can be
rights-and make thoughtful decifind it easier to exercise control
costs drop.
sions-as information transmission
empirical examples, I, unforWhile there are plenty of qualitative
evidence that these falling interactunately, do not have quantitative
at 3-4.
207 See Austin, supra note 140,
to increase the
at 104. Standardization also helps
23,
note
supra
Davenport,
208 See
facilitating the
costs-by
drives down production
supply of a given activity-and thus
102.
the activity. Id. at
entry of new vendors to perform
text.
notes 158-64 and accompanying
supra
described
is
209 This project
210 See supra Part 1II.A.2.
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activity. Such a study
tion costs have led to a surge in monitoring
sure whether it is possible to gather
would be fascinating, but I am not
what the relevant metrics would
meaningful data-or indeed, even
has only grown rapidly in the
be. Furthermore, business outsourcing
costs are partly responsible for
past decade, and if falling monitoring
to
significant outsourcing contracts
this trend, we should expect most
have extensive risk-mitigation provisions.
to suggest that interYet I do not think that it is too controversial
21
that these changes will increase
action costs are falling -or to argue
If all this is indeed true,
the effectiveness of monitoring investments.
for the rise of outsourcing-that
then the conventional explanation
firms to access inexpensive profalling interaction costs are allowing
of the story. Firms may be turning
duction markets-may be only half
the gains of remote trade, but also
to outsourcing not only to capture
to contain the hazards of
because they are finding it easier
outsourcing.
a recent outsourcing project
Consider, as a final illustration,
to
bank long known for its aversion
launched by Wachovia, a large US
212 Under competitive pressure,
offshoring and business outsourcing.
new structure, Wachovia eventually
and tempted by an intriguing
overseas. Unlike many financial
decided to move some operations
not wish to start a captive offshore
institutions, however, Wachovia did
the
its corporate borders-because
facility-one remaining within
to manage a division on the other
bank felt that it was too expensive
3
Wachovia thought it would be too
side of the world.M Furthermore,
it had no reputation
attract the best talent because
difficult 2to
14
overseas.
211

Firm, 112
or, Linux and The Nature of the
Cf Yochi Benkler, Coase's Penguin,
producof
models
collaborative

underlying
L.J. 369 (2002) (discussing factors
966-67
Copyright, 42 Hous. L. REv. 953,
and
Contract
tion); Frank H. Easterbrook,
are close
costs
transaction
where
world
us toward the
(2005) ("Technology is moving
Empty Voting and
Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying:
&
Hu
T.C.
Henry
");
....
to zero
("[C]ontinued
(2006)
S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 844-45
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79
costs.");
transaction
down
drive
to
are likely
improvements in financial technology
Fool Born
Motley
a
Is
Welfare:
Investor
and
Costs,
Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions
between tech806-12 (1997) (discussing the link
791,
L.Q.
U.
WAsm.
75
Minute?,
Every
costs in securities regulation).
nology and falling transactions
is nothing I
CEO of Wachovia, has said "There
212 For example, Ken Thomson,
we don't
but
offshore,'
not
will
clock and say, 'We
would rather do than turn back the
Jan. 30,
ONLINE,
WK.
Bus.
Heart,
Change of
have that luxury." Dean Foust, Wachovia's
2006, http://www.businessweek cor/magazine/content/06-05/b3969422.htm.

YALE

213
214

Id.
Id.

2007]

BUSINESS

OUTSOURCING

AND

THE AGENCY

COST PROBLEM

1001

Instead, Wachovia signed an outsourcing contract with Genpact,
a large Indian vendor who had recently been spun off from General
Electric. Genpact took over a wide variety of business processes for
Wachovia, 2 15 although the exact details of the contract have been kept
confidential. 2 16 It is understood, however, that the deal is structured
to provide Wachovia with a "virtual captive" unit-one where it can
retain tremendous control over the hiring and firing of employees
and other key decisions.2 1 7 The goal is to retain the control of a captive unit while also realizing greater cost savings and flexibility from
outsourcing. 218 Exercising these control rights will certainly prove
more expensive for Wachovia than leaving everything to Genpact's
discretion. But, then again, falling interaction costs may make it easier for Wachovia to make important decisions from afar, thereby narrowing agency cost risk. It is interesting to ask whether Wachovia
would have even undertaken this project if it could not retain this
control.
It is important to point out that the monitoring tactics discussed
in this Article cannot fully eliminate the agency costs of outsourcing.
Information asymmetry will persist-even in an age of cheap communication-and principals will never be able to guard against every possible problem. Furthermore, the incremental expense of these labors
must also be added to the agency cost toll. 2 19 But falling interaction
costs might allow firms to establish an interesting array of hybrid structures and governance terms-ones that straddle the traditional distinction between markets and hierarchies.2 2 0 The Wachovia deal is an
intriguing example of this. Joint ventures and alliances between firms
have always existed as a middle-of-the-road approach, 2 2 1 but the
momentum may be increasing in the outsourcing context.
In summary, then, I would argue that a complete understanding
of the outsourcing explosion needs to consider the exogenous forces
215 Wachovia also signed outsourcing contracts with Hewitt Associates in the
United States and with Infosys Technologies and Cognizant Technologies in India.
Id.

216 See Press Release, Wachovia, Wachovia and Genpact Announce Outsourcing
Agreement (Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://www.wachovia.com/small-biz/page/
printer/0,,447-647%5E1280,00.html.
217 See If in Doubt, Farm it Out, supra note 49, at 7.
218 Id.
219 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308-10.
220 This distinction is discussed supra Part I.B. It would be interesting to consider
whether similar changes are taking place in other economic relationships that present
an agency cost problem. If so, we might expect that improved monitoring effectiveness will lead (or has led) to contractual innovations in these other contexts.
221 See, e.g., Smith, Strategic Alliances, supra note 129, at 304.
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the dual impact of these forces
impacting the global economy-and
The exogenous forceson the benefits and costs of outsourcing.
transportation, and
technology, standardization, communication,
costs, which, in turn,
probably others-collectively lower interaction
supply markets where firms can
has two effects. First, it opens new
And second, lower interobtain the benefits of cheaper production.
by making it easier to
action costs grease the gears of outsourcingThe conventional expladetect and prevent agency cost distortions.
focuses mostly on the first
nation for the rise of business outsourcing
must also include the second.
effect. I contend, however, that we
CONCLUSION

India to speak at a weekNear the end of 2005, I flew to Kolkata,
I arrived just in time to give
end conference on business outsourcing.
of crowd to expect. To my surthe talk and was not sure what sort
and marched up to a stage
prise, I was ushered into a large ballroom
were huge video screens on
in front of a thousand people. There
ten-foot face was broadcast for the
either side of the stage, and my
on Inauguration Day. After the
next half hour like the President's
reporters and eager entrepreneurs
talk was over, dozens of newspaper
filmed for the nightly television
flocked up to interview me, and I was
good-but not that good.
news. I thought the speech was pretty
exhibit halls, I saw
Later, as I wandered through the conference
their services-and hundreds
thousands of vendors fervently pushing
to ride the outsourcing wave. I had
of thousands of participants trying
but it finally sunk in just how
studied all the statistics and projections,
economic activity. The obvious
differently firms are organizing their
question is why.
of business outsourcing can
This Article has argued that the rise
an outsourcing project as an
be explained, at least in part, by viewing
sheds new light on the conagency relationship. Such an approach
a typical outsourcing transaction.
tractual framework placed around
to mitigate agency risk through
Specifically, it shows how firms seek
service level agreements,
the use of interlocking contracts, detailed
redundant agents, broad control
staged contractual commitment,
Furthermore, macroeconomic
provisions, and liberal exit rights.
principals to monitor agents with
forces may be making it easier for
explanation for the astonishing
these tools. If so, the conventional
interaction costs are allowing
growth of outsourcing-that falling
markets-may be only half of the
firms to access cheaper production
when business activity is moved to
story. There can be economic gains
to mitigate the dark side of outlow-cost markets. But a greater ability
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march toward ecosourcing may also be behind this unprecedented
nomic globalization.
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